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International Court of Justice

H0083-0002

Official transcript of the International Military Tribunal in the matter of The United States of America, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against Hermann Wilhelm Goering et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany on 14 March, 1946, 1000 to 1700, Lord Justice Lawrence presiding.

HERMANN WILHELM GOERING - resumed.

DIRECT EXAMINATION - continued.

BY DR. STAHMER:

Q Did you call the Party Program to have it compiled?

A No. The Party Program had been compiled and announced when I heard about the movement for the first time, and it was intact.

Q What are the views of this Party Program?

A On the whole positive. It was a matter, of course, that hardly any politician or man with a political mind who agreed with every point of a program of a political party.

Q Did the Party depart from that part of the program that it had in service?

A No.

Q Were they even to be achieved by every means, even illegal?

A Of course, they were to be achieved with every means. The conception "illegal" had better be clarified. If I aim at a revolution, then it is illegal for the State then in existence at the time. If that is achieved then they become the fact and they become legal and lawful. Until 1923, and the date November 9th, I and all of us had the view that we would achieve our aim, even if necessary of a revolution. After the Fuehrer returned from his conference, he decided that in the future we would proceed by legal means with a political fight, and "job up" on the other parties, and the Fuehrer prohibited any illegal action to avoid any setback in the activity of the Party.

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Q When and with what aims was the SS created?

A The SS was created while I was absent abroad. I think it was in 1926 or 1927. Its aims, as far as I could judge at the time and remember nowwere to form a special body within the setup of the Party, and to offer protection for the person of the Fuehrer. Originally it was extremely small.

Q Did you at any time belong to the SS?

A I never belonged to the SS in any way, at any time, in any shape or form, neither actively nor passively.

Q The assumption that you were a general in the SS is, therefore, incorrect?

A Yes, absolutely incorrect.

Q What did you understand by the word "herrenvolk", master race?

A I myself didn't understand anything of that word. In none of my speeches, in none of my writings, will you find that word. It is my view that if you are a master you don't have to emphasize it.

Q What do you understand by "lebensraum", living space?

A That conception is a very controversial one. I have full understanding, and I am asserting before signatories of the Charter, if such powers control more than three-quarters of the world would like to explain it differently. But for us, where 144 people live in one square kilometer, the words "living space" meant the proper proportion for the nourishment of the people and their living standard, and the finding of these conditions.

Q The conception which always arises again is the word "machtergreifung", accession to power.

A I should like to refer to that as a terminus technicus. We might as well have used another word, but this word expresses, in fact, as clearly as possible what did actually occur. That is to say, we got hold of power.

Q What is your attitude to the leadership principle?

A I stood and I still face it with a positive attitude. You must not make the mistake to think that the political structure in different countries has different origins, different developments. Something which suits one country extremely well would fail completely in another. Germany, through centuries, had a monarchy and always knew the leadership principle. Democracy appeared in Germany at a time when Germany was very badly off and had reached rock-bottom,

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I explained yesterday which political difficulties were in existence in Germany: the number of parties, continuous disquiet caused by elections. And, in that connection, a complete alteration of conceptions about authority and responsibility had arisen. The authority was with the masses; responsibility was with the leader. It should have been the opposite.

I have the view that, particularly for Germany, at the time of its lowest, it was important to employ all forces in a positive sense and to use the leadership principle; that is to say, authority at the top, working downwards, and responsibility at the lower level, working upwards. I consider that the only possibility. Naturally, I realize the fact that a principle can lead to the extreme.

May I use a parallel: Take the positive position of the Catholic Church, which is still relying on the leadership principle. And I think I may add to that that Russia, too, could not have survived the great difficulties of this war without the leadership principle.

Q The measures you referred to yesterday to strengthen the power, did they take place in full agreement with Reichspresident von Hindenburg?

A As long as the President was alive, and therefore active, they certainly did take place in agreement with him. And as far as constitutional agreement from him was necessary in paragraph 41, that agreement was obtained.

Q Was the National Socialist Government recognized by foreign governments?

A Our government was recognized from the first day of its existence and remained recognized until the end, unless hostilities caused the diplomatic connections to be severed.

Q Did diplomatic representatives of foreign countries visit your Party rallies in Nurnberg?

A The diplomatic corps and representatives were invited to the Party rally, as being the great event and demonstration of our movement. They were invited and they arrived completely. Not every year, but one I recollect exactly.

Q Until what year?

A Until the last Party rally, 1938.

Q To what extent after the accession to power did you confiscate property of political opponents?

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A Laws were issued which decreed confiscation of the property of people hostile to the state; that is to say, of people we declared to be so. The property of the Communist Party, with its accessories; the property of the Social Democratic Party, was confiscated. But not--and I want to emphasize that--but not the private property of the members or even leaders of these parties. On the contrary, a number of leading Social Democrats who had been ministers or civil servants were given their full pension. In fact, later on it was increased.

Q How do you explain the attacks against the trade unions? Did you proceed against free workers in that connection?

A First of all, the trade unions: Trade unions in Germany were, in their leading majority, very closely connected with the Social Democratic Party, and increasingly with the influence and activities of the communists, and through that with the Communist Party. If not formally, then in fact, there were organs, various active ones at that, of these parties with trade unions.

I am not talking about the masses of the people. I am talking about the group who were leading these trade unions. In addition, there was a smaller Christian trade union as well.

These trade unions aimed, through their leaders and in close connection of these leaders with those parties we regarded as our opponents--they agreed with them to such an extent that they did not fit into our new state in any way. Consequently, the organizations of trade unions were dissolved, and the workers were given the organization of the German Workers Front instead.

The destruction of the liberty of the German worker, in my conception, did never take place. To the contrary, I am convinced that only we gave to the German worker real freedom, which consisted, in the first place, of his right to work, which we secured for him, and that his whole position in the state was particularly emphasized.

We did, of course, attend to two matters which must be regarded as two characteristics of a freedom which I probably misunderstand, and we removed them. Freedom on one side and barring workers on the other. That could not tally with the right to work, and it would not agree with the duty to work, which every citizen has as a duty towards his nation. These two elements, which contributed to the number of unemployed, we removed and replaced with an enormous labor program.

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Creation of work was another predominant point. Our social program has been adopted by others, though under a different name.

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I do not propose to elaborate on their social programs at any length but it was the first time that the workers had the right to paid holidays and that I would only add as an aside. Considerable recreational facilities were created for the workers. Enormous sums were set aside for workers' settlements. The whole living standard of the worker was raised. At that time the worker had been exhausted and exploited. He hardly had any property of his own because of years of unemployment and he had to sell everything or pawn it and thus, whout going into detail, I would like to say finally, that we havenot destroyed free workers but that we have liberated the worker and have relieved him of his unemploy - ment.

Q You talked about the Roehm revolt yesterday. Who was Roehm and what was that revolt?

A Roehm, since 1931, had been the Chief-of-Staff of the SA, that is to say, he was responsible to the Fuehrer, who was Supreme Commander of the SA as far as the matters of the SA were concerned and led it in theFuehrer's name.

The controversy between Roehm and us was that he, Roehm, wanted, like his predecessor Pfeffer, a more revolutionary way to be adopted whereas the Fuehrer, asI said earlier, desired legal developments, the final victory of which could be expected.

After the accession to power Roehm desired under all circumstances to take into his hands the Reich Army Ministry. The Fuehrer refused that pointblank since he did not wish a political leader for the armed forces in any way or wished any political influences to be brought to bearon them. The differences between the armed forces and the Roehm group do not distinctly refer to a difference between the armed forces and the SA, that did not exist. It was merely a question of having these leaders in common and I refer to the SA leadership which did at that time actually exist. He desired to remove the majority of the generals and higher officers who had been members of the German Army all the time. It was his view that these officers did not offer a guarantee for the new state, since, as he expressed it, their backbone had been broken in the course of the years and since they were no longer capable of being

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active elements of the new National Socialist State.

The Fuehrer and I myself had an exactly opposite point of view in this connection.

Secondly, the activities and aims of, I would almost like to say, the Roehm-minded people were directed in a different direction and towards a revolutionary trend. They were opposed to what they called reaction. They desired to adopt a more leftish attitude. They were increasingly opposed to the church and very strongly opposed to the Jews. Altogether, however, and I only refer to the clique consisting of certain persons, they wished to carry out a revolutionary act; that Roehm placed all his people in leading positions in the SA and that the decent elements were removed and that the decent SA, without its knowledge, was misled, is a well known fact.

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If perpetrations occurred during that time then they always occurred in connection with the same persons, that is to say, firstly originating from the Berlin SA leader Ernst, secondly the Breslau leader Heines, and the Munich man Stettin.

A few weeks before the Roehm revolt a low ranking SA leader confided in me and told me that he heard that an action against the Fuehrer and his suite was being planned so that the Third Reich could expeditiously be replaced by the final Fourth Reich, an expression which these people used. I myself was urged and asked not only to place guards of a police regiment outside my house but to have a guard of honor of the SA as well. I had agreed and later on I heard from the commander of that troop just what the purpose of that guard of honor had been, namely that after a certain date they were to arrest me.

I knew Roehm very well. I had him brought to me. I put the things which I had heard openly to him. I reminded him of our mutual fight and I asked him to have extreme faith in the Fuehrer. He raised roughly the same arguments which I have just stated. But he assured me that, of course, he was not thinking of doing anything against the Fuehrer. Shortly afterward I received further news to the effect that he had close connections with those circles who also were strongly opposed to us and that was, first of all the group around the former Chancellor Schleicher. There was the group around the ex-party member who had been excluded, and ex-member of the German Parliment, Strasser. There were the people who had been members of the former trade unions and had extended very far to the political left. I felt it my duty to consult the Fuehrer on the subject. I was astonished when he told me that he too knew about these things and that he considered them to be a threat. He said that he wished however, to await further developments and observe them carefully.

The next event occurred approximately -- exactly as the witness Koerner described it here and I can leave it out. I was given the order in northern Germany to proceed immediately against those men of the group Roehm. Some of them were ordered to be arrested. As far as Ernst is concerned, the SA leader of Pomerania and two or three others, the Fuehrer ordered in the course of that day that they were to be executed. He himself went to Bavaria where the last meeting of a number of Roehm leaders was taking place at the time and arrested personally Roehm and these people at Wiessee.

At that time this whole matter presented a real threat since some SA units who had been deceived and given wrong orders had been armed. At one spot only there was a very short fight and some SA leaders were shot. I deputized the arrest to the police which in Prussia then was under Himmler's and Heydrich's lead. When the headquarters of the SA leader Ernst, in Berlin, were occupied we found in the cellars of that headquarters more machine pistols then the whole Prussian Order Police had in their possession.

After the Fuehrer had ordered, on the strength of the events which were observed at Wiessee, who should be shot and the order for Ernst, Heidebrecht and some of the other of Roehm's followers was issued. There was no order to shoot the other people who were ordered to be arrested. In the course of the arrest of the former Reich Chancellor Schleicher the killing of himself and his wife did occur. An investigation into this event took place and it was found that when Schleicher was arrested, according to the statements of two witnesses, he reached for a pistol to kill himself, possibly, whereupon these two men raised their pistols and Mrs. Schleicher threw herself upon one of them to hold him and he maintained that at that moment his revolver went off.

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We deeply regretted that event.

In the course of that evening, I heard that a number of other people had been shot as well, even some people who had nothing at all do with that Roehm revolt.

The Fuehrer came to Berlin that same evening. After I heard that later during that night, I visited him at lunchtime of the following day. I asked him to issue an order immediately that any further execution was prohibited by him, the Fuehrer, although two further people who were strongly involved and who had been ordered to be executed by the Fuehrer were still alive. These people were, in fact, left alive. I asked him to do that because I was worried that the whole matter would assume larger proportions, as, in fact, it had done to some extent, and I told the Fuehrer that under no circumstances should there be any further bloodshed.

As a consequence, subsequently that order was given by the Fuehrer in my presence, and it was communicated to all departments concerned. The action was then announced in the Reichstag, and through the Reichstag and the Reichspresident recognized as an action in an emergency, and approved of. But of course, at the same time, it was regretted that, as in all such incidents, there had been a certain amount of perpetrations.

The number of victims has often been exaggerated. As far as I can remember exactly today, 72 or 76 people were concerned, and the majority of them were executed in Sourthern Germany.

Q Did you have knowledge of the development which represented the attitude of the Party and the State toward the churches?

A Certainly. But as my final remark on the Roehm Putsch, I should like to emphasize that I assumed full responsibility for the actions taken against those people by order of the Fuehrer, which I had passed on -- and I am referring to Ernst, Heidebrecht, and several others -- and that even today I am of the opinion that I acted correctly. That was confirmed by the Reichspresident, but no such confirmation was necessary to convince me that here was a danger to the State with which I had to deal.

On the attitude towards the churches, the Fuehrer's attitude was a generous one, at least at the beginning, absolutely generour. I would not like to say that it was positive in the sense that he himself was a convinced

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follower of any confession, but it was generous and positive in the sense that he recognized the necessity of churches. Although he himself was a Catholic, he wished that there should be a stronger position for the Protestant church in Germany, since two-thirds of Germany was Protestant.

The Protestant church, however, was divided into county churches; various small differences were made, and that was the reason why they fought against each other and had a war for 30 years, but as far as we were concerned, it did not appear quite so decisive and important. They called themselves Reformed Union, Lutheran -- I cannot say myself just how many of them there were.

Constitutionally, as Prussian Prime Minister, I was in theory the highest clergyman of the Prussian Church, but I did not concern myself with these matters a great deal.

The union of the Protestant Church was aimed at by the Fuehrer, and he wanted to realize it by appointing a Reichsbishop so that there should be a high Protestant leader with the high Catholic leaders in the Reich. To begin with, he left the choice to the Protestant churches, but they would not agree. Finally, they produced one man and that was the only man who didn't suit us. The man who became Reichsbishop had the Fuehrer's confidence to a larger degree than all the other bishops in the Reich.

With the Catholic Church, the Fuehrer ordered a concordat to be concluded through Herr von Papen. Shortly after that agreement was concluded by Herr von Papen, I visited the Pope myself. I had numerous connections with the higher Catholic clergy because of my Catholic mother, and in that manner I could enter both. I am a Protestant.

But there was one view the Fuehrer had presented, of course -- we all represented it and I represented it -- and that was that politics should be removed from the churches. I didn't consider it right -- and that I would like to say quite openly -- that one day the priest in the church would humbly concern himself with the sould of his sheep, and that the following day, in Parliament, he would make a more or less belligerent speech.

That separation was planned by us, that is to say, the clergy were to concentrate on their sphere of influence, and refrain from getting involved in

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political matters. By having political parties with strong religious interests in Germany, a considerable muddle had arisen here in Germany, and that is the explanation of just how it was possible that with these political opponents placing themselves originally on the parliamentary level of election campaigns, belligerent moods against the church did occur in connection with some of our

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people. You must not forget that such election fights and speeches took place between political representatives of our Party and clergymen who were representatives of those Parties which were closely tied to the Church.

From that situation, and a certain animosity, arises the fact that a more violent faction--if I may use that expression in this connection--did not forget this fight, and they, in their turn, were once more transferring the fight to yet another level. But the Fuehrer's attitude was that the churches should be given the possibility of developing and existing.

It is a matter of course that a political movement and Party which gradually is absorbing more or less the majority of the whole German nation, and which now, in its active political part, also contains the politically active persons of Germany, in spite of the leadership principle does not create the same conceptions everywhere. The speed, the methods, the attitude, are always different, and such large movements, even if they are authoritatively led, must contain certain groups which are the result of certain problems, and if I am to name the group in this connection, which within the pledge of churches still represented a political, I won't say danger, but undesirable institution, then that was a group in which two personalities became predominant, Himmler on one side and Bormann, particularly later--much later than Himmler--on the other side.

Himmler's motives were less of a political than mystical nature. As far as Bormann is concerned, his aims were much more clear-cut. It was clear too, that from among a large group of gauleiters, one or another might be more keenly interested in that fight against the Church. There were a number of Gaus where everything was in fine shape so far as the churches were concerned, and there were others where there was a keen fight against the churches.

I did interfere personally on frequent occasions, first of all to demonstrate my attitude and to have a certain calming influence.

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Thus, in the Prussian Ministerial Council I called in certain men in whom I had a great deal of confidence, including a high Protestant and a high Catholic priest.

I myself am not what you might call a church-goer, but I have always been a member of the church, and as far as functions which you carry out in church are concerned, such as marriage, christening, and funerals, they have always been carried out in my house by the church.

My views in connection with that were to assist those people in this fight of opinions who were too weak to know what they should do. My view was to show them that the second man in the State went to church, that he had himself christened, that he had himself married, that he had himself confirmed, so when they saw that, they would do that as well. From the number of letters which I received as a result, I could see that I had done the right thing.

As time went by, in other spheres as well as this, the situation became more critical, and on one other occasion during the early years of this war, I had a discussion on it with the Fuehrer. I told him that we should now concern ourselves with the fact that every German was doing his duty and that every soldier was bravely going to his death if need be, and if, in that connection, his religious belief could be of assistance to him, be he of this or that religion, that could only be an advantage. The Fuehrer agreed absolutely. I was in the Air Force and deliberately had no clergyman parties of my own. I was of the opinion that every member of the Air Force should go to the priest in whom he had the most confidence.

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That was continually communicated to the soldiers. As far as the church was concerned, I told them that I considered praying a good thing, "But you should pray in the churches and not in the barracks." In that manner I eliminated from the Air Force any religious upset, and I insured complete liberty of conscience for everyone.

The difficulties I ran into increased rapidly and I cannot really give you the reason. It happened during the last two or three years of the war. This may be due to the fact that in some of the occupied territories the clergymen -- and that was particularly the case in Polish districts and Czech districts -- were strongly nationalist representatives and that here clashes arose between those on the political level with those on the religious level, which in turn, of course, would affect the churches. Anyway, I do not know whether this was one of the reasons, but I can consider that it probably was.

On the whole, I would like to say that the Fuehrer himself was not opposed to the churches. In fact, he told me on one occasion that in certain things even as a leader you cannot assert yourself completely, if certain necessities are unclarified, and religious belief as far as the reconstruction of the churches is concerned, will probably be talkedabout and thought about a great deal. But he said he himself neither thought that he was to be a church reformer nor did he feel that anyone of his political leaders should be active on that level.

Q Now, in the course of years a large number of clergymen both in Germany and the occupied territories, as you said -- Poland and Czecho-Slovakia -- were taken to concentration camps. Do you know anything about that?

A I knew that to begin with in Germany a number of clergymen were taken to concentration camps. The case of Niemoeller was common knowledge. I don't want to go into it in detail, because it is well known.

A number of other clergymen were sent to concentration camps but only during the later years when the fight increased, for making political speeches in the churches. They were criticizing measures of the State and Party, and depending on the severity of that criticism the police would then interfere.

I told Himmler on one occasion that I did not think it was clever to arrest clergymen, that as long as they talked in church they should be allowed to say what they wanted; but if they made political speeches outside the churches then he could interfere and proceed against them just as he would in connection with any other people who were opposed to the State. A number of clergymen who went

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very far in their criticism were not arrested.

As far as the arrest of clergymen from occupied territories is concerned, I have heard about it; and I said earlier on, that this did not occur on the church level, because they were clergymen, but that it occurred because they were in their point of view strongly nationalist and consequently often were involved in actions hostile to the occupied forces.

Q The Party program included two points. The first was the Jewish problem. What was your basic attitude towards that?

A That question, which is so strongly emphasized in the indictment, forces me under all circumstances to refer to certain principles and conditions.

After Germany's collapse in 1918, Jewry became supremely prominent in Germany, in all sectors of life, but particularly the political picture; in general culturally, but particularly in the political field. The fighting men came back from the front. They had nothing. They faced nothing, and now they saw a large number of the Jewish element who had come in during the war from Poland and the East, in positions, particularly economic positions. It is known that under the influence of the war and its business and demobilization, considerable possibilities existed of doing business. There was inflation, deflation -- with all that, enormous transfers, shifting of weight of capital, had taken place.

There were many Jews who did not show the necessary restraint and who more and more appeared in public, so that they invited certain comparisons: the figures they represented, the positions they controlled, in comparison to the German people generally -- add to this that particularly that the party which had been turned down for their anti-national attitude also had a number of Jewish leaders who were in no proportion to the total number of Jews.

That did not only apply to Germany, but also to Austria, which we have always considered German. There all the Social Democrat leaders were practically exclusively Jews. They played a very considerable part in politics, particularly in connection with the left-wing parties, and they also became very prominent in the press and political life.

At that time an uninterrupted attack against anything national and against all national conceptions and ideals took place. I only remind you of all the publications, articles, which dragged things into the mud; I remind you of the disproportion in the field of art which was also carried out in that way; I

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remind you of those that lowered morale at the front and flung mud at the ideal of the brave soldier. In fact, I could quote endless examples of such articles, books, representations and so forth which would lead too far afield, and I am in fact not too well informed on the subject; but anyway, all that caused a defensive attitude, a defensive movement, which was by no means created through National Socialism but which had existed before.

This defensive attitude existed during the war, and it became even more prominent after the war when the influence of Jewry became so prominent and predominant.

In addition, particularly in the cultural sphere, so many things had been so differently from the German field, that here too there was a considerable split. Add to that, particularly in economy, in the economic field, disregarding the Western industry, there occurred an almost exclusive lead of Jewry and that that lead was in the hands of elements who were even condemned by the old Jewish families in the country.

Then the movement made its program -- compiledits program -- which was made by a few simple people. As far as I know, when it was drafted Adolf Hitler wasn't even participating or not yet even in leadership. When that program was drafted, that point was included in it, which at that time was much in the foreground amongst large sections of the German people, as a defensive point. So that before that, there had been the Raeterepublic; the murder of hostages had taken place. You must understand that this, as a program created in Munich by simple people, would contain that point as a defensive measure.

News of that great republic in Hungary reached us saying that again Jews were prominent in the lead, and therefore when the program became known, the Party -- which was then extremely small -- was not originally taken seriously, and laughed at. But a concentrated attack of the entire Jewish press and Jewish-influenced press took place, which was directed against the movement. Everywhere Jewry was in the lead in the fight against National Socialism. In the press, be it in politics, be it in the cultural life -- wherever it was -- National Socialism was ridiculed; be it in the economic sphere he who was a National Socialist would not get a position, or the National Socialist business-man could not get supplies or advertising.

These are conditions that became prominent at the time. It all resulted in

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a strong defensive attitude on the part of the Party. It led right at the beginning to an increase in influence which had originally not been intended in their program. The program wished one thing very clearly: That Germany should be led by Germans. And it was desired that the leadership and the forming of Germany's political state should be conducted by German people who could reflect the sentiments of the German people much more than people of a different race. Originally it was merely proposed to exclude Jewry from politics and the leadership of the State.

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Later on the cultural field was added to that, and that was because of the very strong fight which had developed particularly in that sphere between Jews on one side and National Socialism on the other.

I believe that if here many a hard word has been said by us against Jews and Jewry, I would still be in a position to quote papers, books, periodicals and features on the side of the opponents which are insults that can not in any way be equalled or excelled upon. All that would obviously lead to a deep controversy.

Shortly after the coming into power, a lot of exceptions were made. Jewswho had taken part in the world war and who had been decorated were considered, and theyremained unaffected by measures directed against Jews in civil service.

Anyway, as I said, the chief aim was the exclusion from the political sphere, later on the cultural sphere. The Nurnberg laws had the purpose of clarifying the separation of races, and in particular to define the conception of a mixed person for the future, since the idea of the half Jew or the quarter Jew led to continuous differences and a muddle.

Here, too, I wish to emphasize that I personally have had frequent personal discussions with the Fuehrer regarding the conception of mixed persons and that I pointed out to the Fuehrer that once Germans and Jews were clearly separated, it would be possible to have yet another category between the two which in turn would be an unclarified section of the German people which would not stand on the same level with the other Germans. I suggested to him that here, by a general order, the conception of the person of mixed race should be excluded and that these people should be put on the same footing as other Germans.

The Fuehrer was very strongly interested in that train of thought, and he was adopting a perfectly positive attitude to my ideas. In that direction he had, in fact, given certain preparatory orders. After that the stormy days of the Sudeten crisis, Czechoslovakia, occupation of the Rhineland, Poland, arose, and the question of the mixed people moved into the background, but at the beginning of the war the Fuehrer told me that he was prepared to give this thing a positive solution, but only after the war.

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The Nurnberg laws were to exclude for the future that conception of people of mixed race. Consequently, it was planned in thepenal paragraphs of the Nurnberg laws that never the women but always the man should be punishable, no matter whether the man was German or Jewish. The German woman or the Jewess could not be punished. After that quieter times came, and the Fuehrer always had the view that for the time being Jews should be admitted, not into the leading positions in the economy, but certainly in positions in the economy. Continuously increasing emigration should help to solve that problem. In spite of the continuous differences and disquiet which arose in the economic field, the Jews, therefore, remained untouched in their economic positions.

The extraordinary increase in severity of the measures which occurred later on did not really take place until the events of 1938 and then more so after the war had started, but here, once more, there was on e group who was more radical, as far as the Jewish question was concerned, to whom the Jewish question was more in the foreground than to other groups of that movement.

I must emphasize particularly at this moment that the conceptions of National Socialism can be understood in various ways, and the various points of the program were of more importanceto one and of less to another. In other words, one considered the point which was to make Germany strong and free as the most important one. Another might say thatthe Jewish point was the most important.

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off? Dr. Stahmer, can you inform the Tribunal how much longer you think the defendant Goering will be in the examination in chief?

DR. STAHMER: I think that we shall finish in the course of tomorrow morning.

THE PRESIDENT: That is a very long time.

DR. STAHMER: I shall do my best to shorten it. I shall be anxious to shorten it.

(A recess was taken)

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BY DR. STAHMER:

Q What was your participation in the Nurnberg Laws of 1935?

A In my capacity as the President of the Reichstag, at the time when the Reichstag met here in Nurnberg, I announced these laws simultaneously with the law concerning the new banner, the Reich flag.

Q In the Indictment it says that the destruction of the Jewish race was part of the plan of aggressive war.

A That has nothing to do with the planning of aggressive war, and the destruction of the Jewish race was not originally planned.

Q Were you a party to the attacks against the Jews in November 1938?

A I should like to refer to that briefly. I gathered yesterday, from the cross-examination of the witness Koerner, that a misunderstanding had arisen here. On the 9th of November the march on the Hall of Field Marshals (Feldherrnhalle) was celebrated. This march was repeated every year; the leaders of the movement met on that occasion. Koerner referred to that when he said that everybody came to Munich. It was the custom that after the march was over practically everybody met at the Town Hall in Munich for dinner, at which the Fuehrer was also present.

I never attended that dinner in any of the years in question, since I used to utilize my stay in Munich on that occasion to attend to various other matters in the afternoon. Neither did I take part in that dinner on that occasion, nor did Koerner. He and I left in the evening in my special train and went to Berlin. As I heard later when the investigation was carried out, on the occasion of that dinner and after the Fuehrer left, Goebbels announced that the seriously wounded secretary of the Embassy in Paris had died of his wounds, and a certain amount of excitement occurred. As a result, apparently Goebbels used words concerning reprisals, and in his way he was probably the most outstanding representative of the anti-Semitic section. He probably gave the cause for the following events, but that was after the Fuehrer had left.

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I myself heard of the events when I returned to Berlin. To start with, the ticket collector of my carriage told me that he had seen strange people at Halle. Half an hour later I called on my adjutant, who reported to me that riots had taken place during the night, that Jewish businesses had been smashed and plundered, and that synagogues had been set on fire. That was all I could gather at the time. He didn't know any more himself.

I proceeded to my apartment and I had an immediate call put through to the Gestapo. I demanded a report of the events of that night. That is the report which has been referred to here, and which was made to me by the Chief of the Gestapo, Heydrich, with reference to the events as far as he knew them at the time when, in the evening of the following day, I heard about it.

The Fuehrer too arrived in Berlin in the course of the morning. I told him, then and there, having in the meantime heard that Goebbels had certainly been strongly involved as the originator, I told the Fuehrer that it was impossible for me to have such events take place, particularly at that time, that I was very much concerned, in connection with the Four Year Plan, to concentrate the entire economic field, and that I had, in the course of speeches to the nation, asked that each bit of metal, each rusty nail, every bit of scrap metal, should be collected and utilized. I said that it was impossible that a man who was not responsible for that sphere of influence should complicate and disturb my extremely difficult economic task by destroying so many economic values, on the one hand, and, on the other, introducing so much disturbance into the economic life.

The Fuehrer did, to some extent, make apologies, but he generally agreed with me. He agreed that such events were not to take place and must not be allowed to take place. I pointed out to him, too, that shortly after the Munich agreement such matters would assume unfavorable foreign political proportions.

In the afternoon I had another discussion with the Fuehrer. In the meantime Goebbels had been to see him, to whom I had also

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expressed over the telephone in unmistakable terms what my conception was. I used extremely severe words. I told him particularly, at the time, that I was not anxious to suffer the consequences of his uncontrolled actions and pay the bill for them, so far as the economic sector was concerned.

In the meantime the Fuehrer had been influenced by Goebbels, and then he changed his mind. Just what Goebbels told him and just how far he referred to the excited methods to the Fuehrer, or how far he mentioned urgent questions, I don't know, but at any rate the Fuehrer's views were not the same as they were on the occasion of my first complaint.

Whilst we were talking, Goebbels joined us. He had been in the house. He started his usual talk, that it could not be tolerated, that this was the second or third murder in foreign countries committed by a Jew against a National Socialist, and it was on that occasion that he first made the suggestion that a fine should be imposed upon the Jews. He wished that the Gaue should collect such a fine themselves, and he demanded an almost incredibly high figure.

I talked about this and told the Fuehrer that, if there was to be a fine, then the Reich must collect it. I said, "Mr. Goebbels has the most Jews in Berlin, and he would therefore not be the suitable person to do such a thing, since he is the most interested party. Apart from that, if such measures are to be taken, then only the sovereign state has the right to carry them out."

After a short discussion about the figure, one hundred billion was settled upon. I pointed out to the Fuehrer that under certain circumstances that figure would have repercussions upon the taxation income of the state. Following that, the Fuehrer wished and ordered that now the economic solution was to be carried through, so that there would be no further causes of similar events. In the first place, the obvious and visible Jewish businesses should be aryanized, in particular, department stores. Continuous difficulties arose over

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them, due to the fact that the employees and civil servants of the Ministries, who could only do their shopping between 6 and 7 in the evening, were often going to these stores, and had certain difficulties because of that. He ordered, in large terms, what should be done.

Subsequently, I called the meeting of November 12, and I ordered the officials concerned to be present. Unfortunately, the Fuehrer had demanded that a commission should be appointed and that Goebbels should be present at it. He was, in fact, there, and I said that he had nothing to do with economic questions. The discussion was very lively. We were all irritated during that meeting. Following that, I had the economic laws drafted and used them later on.

Other suggestions and proposals which were outside the economic sphere, such as restriction of travel, restriction of residence, prohibition from entering certain spots, were not issued by me since they did not belong in my sphere of influence, and since I had not any corresponding orders. They were issued later on in the sphere of influence of the Police and not by me, and certain alleviations were brought about through my interference.

I should like to emphasize that in spite of the fact that I had both a verbal and written order from the Fuehrer to carry out these laws and issue them, I assume full and absolute responsibility for these laws, which bear my signature, because I have published them and consequently I am responsible. I do not propose to hide in any way behind the Fuehrer order.

Q Another matter. What were the reasons that the Disarmament Conference was cancelled and that we left the League of Nations?

A The chief reasons for that were, first of all, that the other states who, after completion of disarmament on the part of Germany had also taken upon themselves the duty to disarm, did not carry that out; the second point was that we ascertained that there was a lack of any preparedness or any willingness to meet justified German applications for revisions in any way; thirdly, that there were repeated violations against the Treaty of Versailles and against the

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statues of the League of Nations, on the part of other states, Poland, Lithuania, and so on, which, on the part of the League of Nations, were criticized but not terminated, and accepted as an accomplished fact; fourth, that all complaints on the part of Germany regarding the question of minorities, though discussed and well-meaning advice given, were imparted to the states in question, but nothing was done to rectify the position.

Those are the reasons for leaving the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference.

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Q Why did Hitler decide to rearm and reintroduce the draft?

A When Germany left the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference, it simultaneously announced its clear-cut decision to the leading powers concerned, which was to achieve general disarmament.

The Fuehrer made various proposals, which can be assumed to be historically known: restriction to a certain number of men of the armed forces, limitation to certain arms, abolish fighting arms, including bombs, and various other points. Each one of these proposals was refused and did not come up for general discussion or consideration.

When the clear-cut realization was reached with the Fuehrer and us that the other parties were not willing to disarm but that they, on the contrary, were intending otherwise, and that the powers in East Russia were carrying out rearmament, it became necessary, for the securing of our most vital interests and those of the German people and its survival and security, for us also to make ourselves free of the ties and to rearm in such a way as was now necessitated by the interests and security of the Reich. That was the first condition for the necessity of re-introducing the draft.

Q To what extent was theAir Force interested in participating in rearmament?

A When in 1933 I founded the Air Ministry, we did not yet tackle the question of rearmament. In spite of that, I did arrange for certain basic conditions. I immediately enlarged production. I increased air traffic over and above the actual necessities so as to be able to train a larger number of pilots.

At thattime I took over a number of young people, lieutenants, ensigns, who left the armed forces, the Wehrmacht, so as to enter commercial flying and to learn to fly there.

I was aware of the facts right from the beginning that it was one of the most essential conditions for the security of my nation that protection in the air should be achieved.

Originally it was my belief that a defensive Air Force, in other words, a fighter force, might suffice, but upon reflection I realized -- and I want to emphasize what the Witness Fieldmarshal Kesselring said on

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that subject--that a fighter force alone for defensive purposes would be lost, and that even a defensive air force must contain bombers so that it can be used offensively against the enemy air force on the ground.

Consequently, based on commercial aircraft, I had bomber aircraft developed. In the beginning rearmament proceeded slowly. Everything had to be done, since nothing existed in the way of air rearmament.

In 1935 I told the Fuehrer that I now considered it appropriate, after we had had repeated refusals to our proposals, to declare to the world openly that we were creating an air force, and that I had already created a certain basis for that. This took place in the form of an interview which I gave to a British correspondent.

Now I could proceed to rearm on a larger scale, but in spite of that we confined ourselves to what we called a risky Air Force. There were risks that came into it, because if an opponent who was to attack Germany should know that he wouldmeet some air force which was by no means strong, if he on his own part were in any way decisive, then this would involve a risk.

In 1936 follows the famous record which was presented to the Witness Bodenschatz, where I said that we must put ourselves on the basis of rearming from that moment, and that money mattered nothing, where I said I would take responsibility for overdrawing the budget.

Since nothing had existed before, I could only catch up quickly if the aircraft production on one side was made to work at maximum speed and with maximum effort, and if, on the other hand, the training program was simultaneously carried out with the greatest possible speed.

The situation in 1936 is defined by me in thatprotocol as serious. Other states had not disarmed, but here and there they had neglected their air forces, and they were catching up lost ground, and considerable discussions took place, in England, about modernizing and increasing the air force, while feverish activities were taking place in Russia, so that we had clearevidence. I shall refer to the question of Russia and their air force later.

When the Civil War broke out in Spain, France sent a call for help to Germany and asked for support, particularly in the air. We must not

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forget that Franco with his troops was stationed in Africa. He could not get across since the fleet was in the hands of the Communists, or, as they called themselves at the time, the Revolutionary Government.

The decisive factor was that the troops came to Spain. The Fuehrer thought about the matter. I urged him to give it support under all circumstances; One, to prevent further spreading of Communism in that theater; and, secondly, so as to have an opportunity to try my young air force on that occasion in one or the other technical aspects.

Upon permission from the Fuehrer, I sent a considerable share of my transport fleet and a number of experimental units of fighters, bombers, and anti-aircraft guns, down to Spain. In that way I had an opportunity to ascertain under combat conditions whether the material had been developed appropriately.

So that the personnel too could gather a certain amount of experiance, I saw to it that there was a continuous flow. In other words, new people continuously went and the others were recalled.

The rebuilding of the Air Force demanded as a basic condition the creation of a large section of new industries. It didn't help me to build a strong Air Force and not to have any petrol for it. Here, too, therefore, I had to force the construction of the necessary industrial works. There were other auxiliary industries, aluminum, for instance. And since I had created the Air Force for the security of the Reich, and since the tools of war should be modernized as the most important share of building up the armed forces, I had the duty as Supreme Commander to do everything to develop it to its absolute peak. I had to make a maximum effort, therefore, to get to work, and that is what I did.

Much has been said during cross examination about four-engine bombers, two-engine bombers, et cetera. The witnesses made statements to the best of their knowledge and ability, but they could only talk about certain small factors, and they gave their opinion from their point of view. Solely responsible, was I, and I am. I was Supreme Commander and the minister responsible for that rearmament. I was technically responsible. I was responsible for training. I was responsible for the spirit of the Air Force.

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If at the beginning and at that stage I didn't build any four-engine bombers, then it wasn't because I had certain qualms or was worried that they might be interpreted as being an aggressive Air Force. That this might be held against me would not have disturbed me for one minute. My only reason was because technical and production conditions were not at the time existing. As far as my industry was concerned, that bomber had not been developed, at any rate not so that I could use it. Secondly, I was still short of aluminum, and every semi-expert knows justhow much aluminum a four-engine bomber absorbs or how much aluminum you need for a fighter or for a fast two-engine bomber, and how many you can build.

To start with, therefore, I had to ascertain who could be the potential opponents in a war to start with: Are the technical conditions for the meeting of an attack against Germany all right? The chief opponent I had to think about was Russia, but of course England, France and Italy had to be considered since it was my duty to consider all possibilities.

As far as the European theatre of war was concerned, I was satisfied to have bombers which could operate against the important centers of re-armament or any one accumulation of airpower. In other words, to start with, I didn't need anything more than those aircraft which would enable me to do that; but in my speech to the aircraft industry there is no doubt I desired most urgently to have a bomber which, loaded with the necessary bombs, could fly to America and back.

I asked them to work on that expeditiously for in the event that America might enter into war against Germany I could also reach the American armament industry. In other words, it wasn't that I didn't want them. I even, as far as I remember, created a competition for the best bomber capable of flying at great height and at great speed and large distances. Even before the beginning of the war we were developing propellerless aircraft. In fact, summing up, I would heartily say that I did everything that was possible under the then prevailing technical and production situation that was necessary to rebuild and re-arm a strong airforce. Under the technical realizations of the time, which would lead us to believe that five years later new advances, technical and tactical, would be made, I made my decision.

I wanted to be prepared to have an airforce which, however the political situation would develop, would be strong enough to protect the nation and would be strong enough to deal blows against the enemy of Germany. It is perfectly correct, as Mr. Justice Jackson asked, whether the speedy elimination of Poland and France was due to the fact that the German airforce acted on modern principles and contributed so much. That was the decisive and factual condition. On the other hand, though this does not concern me, the superiority of the American airforce assured the Allied victory.

m Q Is it the fact that connected with that reconstruction you were given control of raw materials in April 1934?

I need not repeat what the witness Koerner elaborated on yesterday or the day before yesterday with regard to the gradual rise of my person and the inclusion of it into the economic Reich.

The origin was the agriculture crisis in 1935. In the early summer of 1936 the then Minister of War, von Blomberg, met the then Economic Minister and President of the Reich, Schacht, and they came to me and asked me whether I was prepared to back a suggestion of theirs they wanted to take to the Fuehrer, which proposed the use of raw material and foreign currency control. It was agreed

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that I did not appear as an economic expert. I was not, but wer were concerned with the difficulties due to shortage of foreign currency which continuously arose because of our heavy demands. We were concerned with finding and accumulating raw materials and we knew that some one was necessary who was capable of taking measures which were not easily understandable to the nation and which would be backed by his authority. Secondly, it was realized that in this sphere, though not as an expert, I could use my energy as the driving power.

Minister Schacht, who was an expert minister, had difficulties with the Party. He was not a member of the Party. He was on excellent terms with the Fuehrer and myself but not so much with the members of the Party, and the danger arose that the appropriate measures might not be understood. In this connection we must assume that I was the right man to cover him up towards the Party.

That is how that situation arose. But since I, as Airminister, was interested in raw materials I came into the picture more and more on my own initiative. The differences between agriculture and economy about foreign currency were increasing, so that I had to make my own decisions and introduce even more severe measures. Consequently, I entered into the economic field more and more and it became my chief work to accumulate the necessary raw material to ascertain the aim of re-armament and economy. That, in turn, brought about the 4-Year Plan.

Q What was the aim of the 4-Year Plan?

A It was the aim of the 4-Year Plan to achieve two objectives: One, the economy as far as possible, and particularly in the agriculture sector, should be made secure against any crisis; two, that in the event of a war Germany should be able to withstand its effect as far as possible. In other words, it was necessary, firstly, to increase agriculture as far as possible and direct it appropriately, and direct the market, thus accumulating stocks that way, and also by negotiating with foreign countries; and secondly, to establish which raw materials that had been imported up to then could be found in Germany proper, produced there and created there. What raw materials that were difficult to import could be replaced by others which were more easily obtainable In other words, briefly, as far as the agriculture sector was concerned, there should be utilization of every proper square kilometer; it should be properly

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regulated and directed according to the necessities of producing food. There should be direction of animal breeding. Reserves should be accumulated for the times of need in the economic sector. We were concerned with the creation of industries supplying raw materials. Although there was sufficient coal, its production would have to be increased considerably; and it was necessary for raw material of another kind--iron.

The iron industry was dependent on foreign countries to such an extent that in the event of a crisis in this field, the most disasterous situation could have arisen. I can quite understand that from the purely financial business point of view it was all right, but nevertheless we had to attempt to utilize our iron ores which were in existence, though perhaps it was a worse quality than that which Sweden produced, and we had to try to coordinate that industry and have them try to work with that German ore.

Unfortunately, I recklessly allowed myself to let one year pass in which we did not attempt the utilization. Following that I founded the iron works which was given my name. I originally founded it to deal with any ore that was produced on German soil and to leave it at the disposition of the largest metal industry created. There were aluminum works and various other works, and then came the development of the so-called synthetic material industry, which was necessary to replace raw materials which could only be obtained from abroad and under difficult circumstances; and to that, as far as the textile industry was concerned, this also concerned the reorganization of I. G. Farben.

That, roughly, was the task of the 4-Year Plan.

Naturally a third question becomes important in that connection and that is the question of labor, and coordination was necessary here too. An important industry had to have workers and less important industries had to dispense with them. The direction of that pre-war labor problem, which was merely effective internally in Germany before the war, was another task of the 4-Year Plan and its division of labor.

The 4-Year Plan as such very quickly assumed unduly large proportions as anofficial organization, and for two months after Schacht left, I took over the economic ministry and fitted the 4-Year Plan into it and merely retained a very small staff with which I carried out the task, with the assistance of the ministries concerned.

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Q After the carrying out of that plan were there reasons to prepare for aggressive war?

A No, it was the aim of the plan to secure Germany in the event of an economic crisis and toprocure her against a blockade in the event of war, and of course to create the conditions through the 4-Year Plan which were necessary for re-armament. That was one more of its more important tasks.

Q How did the occupation of the Rhineland occur?

A The occupation of the Rhineland was not, as it has been saidhere, a long-prepared affair. What had been discussed previously was not concerned with the occupation of the Rhineland but was the case of an attack against Germany and what the mobilization in the Rhineland would have to be.

The Rhineland occupation occurred for two reasons. The balance which was created through the Pact of Locarno had been disturbed in the rest of Europe, because a new factor had arisen through the assistance arrangement between France and Russia, with their then extremely strong-armed forces. Secondly, there was the Russian-Czechoslovakian mutual agreement, which created a condition which removed the excuse for Locarno as far as we were concerned. Thus, such a threat to Germany had occurred or, shall we say, the possibility of such a threat that it would have been a neglect of duty on the part of the government if we had not done everything to insure the security and safety of the Reich in this connection. But we used sovereign rights of a sovereign state, the Reich, and liberated ourselves from the dishonorable duty not to have a part of the Reich under our jurisdiction, and thus that important part of the Reich was taken under our protection, which was, first of all, carried out against extreme fortification.

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The construction of such defense and strong fortification system, which is considerable, is only justified if that juncture is regarded as a final and definite one. If I had the intention to alter my frontiers within the near future, then it would never be possible or advisable to create such an enormously expensive enterprise as was the construction of the Western Wall. This was done -- and that I want to emphasize particularly -- from the beginning with a positively defensive aid and a defensive measure -- it was securing the western borders of the Reich against a threat, which became apparent by the new constellation of powers and forces. The pacts with Russia had become a threat to Germany. The actual occupation and the decision carried out was done on very short notice. The troops who marched into the Rhineland were of such small numbers and that is a historical fact, that they were merely a taken occupation force. The air force would not enter the left Rhine territory at all since no ground organization was available. It entered the so-called "demilitarized territory" right of the Rhine, and that is all. In other words, it was that the Rhineland was practically flooded by large numbers of troops but as I said before, there were a few battalions and a few artillery batteries who moved in and with that, carrying out the points of the program and put on record that the Rhineland had come back to the sovereignty of the sovereign German Reich and will in the future be protected accordingly.

Q What were Hitler's aims when he created the Council for the Reich Defense and when he issued the Reich Defense Law?

A The Reich Defense Council, during the last month, played a very important part here. Please, understand me, but I believe that in these months it has been talked about more than it has ever been able to talk since it was originated. To start with, it is called "Reichsverteidigungsrat" and that is the Council for the Defense of the Reich and not Council for the attack. It is such an obvious matter of necessity. It exists in every other country in some form or other, may it be of the same name or a different one but to start with, there was a Committee for the Reich Defense before we came into power and that Committee fought for the Reich defense; there were representatives from all the ministries for the purpose of carrying out preparation for organization which would automatically become necessary in the case of any conflict, but it a war, or be it possibility of a war, or be it a war between other States upon our

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borders, where the question of guarding our neutrality would come into play; at any rate, these are current measures which referred to the mobilization and factors which would have to have been utilized, and how traffic problems would be solved -- in fact, all these matters which I need not refer to in detail since they are so obvious.

These conferences took place in the Committee of the Reich --defense between the representatives of the ministries and were attended by the representatives of the ministry of war. The Council for the Reich Defense was created, first of all, when the armed forces came into their own, but it remained on paper. I think I was Deputy Chairman -- I don't even known -- I heard about that but I assure you, under my oath, I assure you under my oath that at no time and at no date did I participate in a single meeting when the Council for the Defense of the Reich was called together as such. These conferences, which were necessary for the Defense of the Reich, were held in a completely different form and in accordance with the necessities of the situation. Naturally, there were conferences about the defense of the Reich but in the shape of Council for the defense of the Reich, no, it existed, I think on paper, but it never met. But even if it had met, then that would only be logical since this concerns defense and not attack. The Reich Defense law, or rather the Ministerial Council for the Reich Defense, which is probably what you mean, that was created only one day before the outbreak of the war. Since the Council for the Reich Defense did in fact not exist, then, if the Ministerial Council for the Reich Defense is not to be considered the same as, for instance, the War Cabinet that was formed in England when the war broke out, or perhaps in other States. To the contrary, that Ministerial Counsel for the Reich Defense was -- by using abbreviated procedure -- to carry out the necessary war laws and war measures and it was to relieve the Fuehrer, to a considerable extent, who was in fact concerned with the military lead in the military field. The Ministerial Council -- it should therefore start with all these laws which I don't want to mention in detail and which are normal at the beginning of a war in any country. The early period, we met three or four times and after that not at all. I didn't have the time after that, too, and to abbreviate the procedure, these laws were rather circulated and then issued, and one or one and a half years afterwards -- I cannot remember the exact time -

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the Fuehrer placed the issuance of laws before in his own hands and I became an advisor of certain laws, in my capacity of Ministerial Counsel, and that was in the later years practically discontinued. In practice, that Ministerial Council did, I do not think, meet again after 1940.

Q The prosecution has presented a document No. 2261-PS. In that document a Reich Defense Law of the 21 May 1935 is mentioned which, by order of the Fuehrer, was originally drafted. I shall have that document shown to you and, please, will you explain your views on it?

A I know it.

Q Would you please state your views?

A After the Council for the Reich Defense had existed the events of a mobilization caused a Reich Defense Law to be prepared in 1935. The decision or resolution was passed in the Reich Cabinet and that law applied to the case of a mobilization. In fact, it was replaced when mobilization occurred, by the law I have mentioned -- referred to the Ministerial Council of the Defense of the Reich. In that law of that date, before the Four Year Plan, 1935, that law appointed the Plenipotentiary for Economy for the event of mobilization and also a Plenipotentiary for Administration; in other words, if a war occurs, then the total administration was to be concentrated with one minister and all the departments concerning the economy and armament were to be drawn together with another minister. One plenipotentiary for administration appeared more or less before -- did not appear before mobilization. The Plenipotentiary for Economy, on the other hand, -- this title was made publicly known -- was to commit his tasks immediately. That was indeed necessary, from that you can probably gather, and explanation for the reason when the Four Year Plan was created, there was inevitable friction between the Plenipotentiary for Economy and the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan. Both of them were more or less working on similar tasks. When, therefore, in 1936, I was given the task to take care of the Four Year Plan, the activities of the Plenipotentiary for Economy ceased at that time.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, ought I to stop now with the questions?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think that would be a good time.

(A recess was taken from 1245 to 1400 hours)

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Official transcript of the International Military Tribunal in the matter of The United States of America, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against Hermann Wilhelm Goering, et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 14 March 1946, 1400 to 1700. Lord Justice Lawrence, presiding.

HERMANN WILHELM GOERING - resumed.

DIRECT EXAMINATION - continued.

BY DR. STAHMER:

Q Repeatedly a word was used here "Reichsforschungsrat," Reich Research Council, what kind of an institution was that?

A As I believe it was in the year of 1943, when I received the mission to get in there an entirely German research department so far as it was important for armament. Unfortunately, that was done much too late. The purpose was to avoid parallel researches, and useless research, but the concentration of research with a view of problems important for the war. I became President of the Reichs Research Council, and established the directive for research in the sense which I have mentioned.

Q Inconnection with that research was the office of the Airforce?

A No, the Research Office of the Airforce was something entirely different, and it had nothing to do with either research on the one hand, or effort on the other hand. The expression was sort of camouflaged, for when we came to power there was a considerable confusion in the technical part of the surveying of important information, therefore, I founded the Research Office at first. That is an institution where all technical devices for the surveyance of radio, telephone, and all other technical communication institutions would be provided. Since I was only Minister of Aviation I could only do it on my own accord, and I used this camouflage in question. The whole machinery was set up only to take care of the foreign mission, important personalities who had telephones and telegraph connections with foreign countries, and Washington, and to decode their messages, and to leave the utilization to the various departments, as that office had no agent, or no service of information of their own. It was purely a technical office to take care of broadcasts, telephone conversations wherever it was ordered, of telegrams, and less utilization in

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the information to the department concerned. In this connection I may stress that I have read much about the communication by Mr. Messerschmidt, who has been mentioned here for quite sometime, he was the main source for such information to us.

Q What was the purpose and importance of this secret cabinet council which was created a short time after seizure of power?

A In February 1938 it came to the retirement of the War Minister Field Marshal von Blomberg, and simultaneously, or so, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Colonel General von Fritsch retired, that is, to say, the Fuehrer retired him. The coincidence of both of the retirements in the years of the Fuehrer showed a disadvantage of the procedure of the Wehrmacht, the desire to offset this change in the Wehrmacht to theoutside. He said he wanted first to change the foreign minister so that change alone would make a strong impression abroad to the interest that a directive would control or direct military affairs. At that time I protested to the Fuehrer about that. In a long personal -- longthy personal conversation I asked not to consider a change in the foreign ministry. He, however, believed he would have to insist upon it.

A question arose of the fact that a change should be done with Herr von Neurath. The Fuehrer intended to keep Herr von Neurath, for he had the greatest esteem for him in the cabinet. I, personally, have always expressed my respect for Herr von Neurath. Only in order to create no reduction in the prestige of von Neurath, a proposal was made by myself to the Fuehrer. I told him in order to make it appear abroad that von Neurath had not quite retired from foreign policy, I would propose to appoint him chairman of the Secret Cabinet Council. There was no such cabinet for conferences in existence, but the expression would sound where it really would sound quite nice, and anybody could have some idea of what it may mean. The Fuehrer said, "But we can not make him a chairman of this when we have no conference." Thereupon I said, "Then we will make one," and offhand I marked down names of several persons, and of how little important I gave this idea, you may know I was one of the last on that list.

There was a forum created then in the council, and that was the foreign policy, and when I returned I told my friends I think that this was very natural, but the Fuehrer had done little about the council from the foreign ministry, and

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certainly none at all from the council, he wanted to have no work for this. I declare under oath that this cabinet council atno time, not even for one single minute that can be, not even for a constitution, met; of some members, I don't know them, even know they were members.

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Q When was the Reich Cabinet in session last?

A As much as I remember, the last session of the Reich Cabinet was in 1937, and, as much as I can remember, I presided over the last session, because the Fuehrer had left shortly after the beginning. The Fuehrer did not think much of Cabinet meetings. The agenda was too large, in his opinion, and too much was spoken into his plans, and he wanted that changed.

From that time on only individual conversations of Ministers concerned took place. The Ministers thought, very rightly so, that it made their work difficult. A solution was found since I, under the name "Four Year Plan," called the Ministers together more frequently in order to inform them about the general state of affairs. But at no time in the Cabinet or Council of Ministers were any political decisions taken of any importance. For instance, the annexation of Austria, Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia, and finally the war, these things were never discussed in the Cabinet. I know how much the Fuehrer stressed that, of all these things, only those Ministers should be informed, but only a short time before, who definitely had to be included on account of their duties.

I can say here under oath that quite a number of Ministers were informed about the beginning of the war, or the march into Czechoslovakia or the Sudetenland or Austria, as late as any other German citizen, that is, the next morning by radio or the press.

Q What part did you have in the Munich Pact of September 1938?

A The annexation of the Sudeten territory or the solution of the Sudeten problem had always been considered by me a necessity. I also told the Fuehrer after the annexation of Austria I regretted it if his statements had been misunderstood to mean that by the annexation of Austria this question had also been settled.

In November 1937 I stated to Lord Halifax that the annexation of Austria, the solution of the Sudeten German question, in the sense of the return of the Sudeten Germans, and the solution of the Danzig

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problem of a corridor were integral parts of the German policy. Whether they would be demanded today by Hitler, tomorrow by myself or by anybody else, they would remain political aims under all circumstances, which had to be attained. However, both of us agreed that all efforts should be made without resorting to war.

Furthermore, in my conversations with M. Boeret, I had the same position. I told everybody else, publicly and personally, that these three points had to be taken care of, and that not by the fact that one would be solved the others could be forgotten.

I also want to stress that if, in that direction and also in several other directions, the Prosecution accuses us that we had not kept what Germany had promised, also Germany before we came to power-- I want to speak about various speeches where I have said we want the other nations to draw no conclusions based on the promises of the former Government. We will not recognize them. So here, also, there was absolute clarity.

When the Sudeten question approached a crisis and the solution was intended by the Fuehrer, I, as a soldier and commander-in-chief of the air force, according to my duty, made all the preparations ordered for any eventuality. As a politician, I was extremely glad about all attempts to find a peaceful solution. I recognize that at that time I was very grateful when I saw that the British Prime Minister made all efforts. However, the situation on the day before the Munich Agreement had become a very critical one.

It was about 6.30 or 7 o'clock in the morning when the Italian Ambassador, Atolico, called me up. He had to see me immediately on orders from Mussolini. It was about the solution of the Sudeten problem. I told him he should go and see the Foreign Minister. He said he had a special mission from Mussolini to see me first.

I met him, as much as I recall, at 9 o'clock in the morning, and there he suggested that Mussolini was prepared to mediate and to assure a meeting as soon as possible between Germany, Adolph Hitler;

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England, Prime Minister Chamberlain; France, Prime Minister Daladier; and Italy, represented by Mussolini, in order to settle the question peacefully. He saw a possibility and was prepared to take all necessary steps.

He, Mussolini, asked me personally to use all my influence in that direction. I took the Ambassador at once into the Reich Chancellery, and, also, Herr von Neurath, although he was not Foreign Minister at that time, and reported everything to him, explained the advantages to him, which could be seen, and this was the basis for a general ease of tension.

Whether the other current political and diplomatic tendencies could be successful could not be seen at that time, but if four leading statesmen of the four large European nations of the West would meet, then much would be gained by that.

Herr von Neurath reported my thesis, and the Fuehrer finally agreed and said we should call the Duce by telephone. A telephone waited outside. We did that immediately, whereupon Mussolini called the Fuehrer officially and received the agreement, and Munich was decided upon as the place.

Late in the afternoon I was informed by the Italian Embassy that the British Prime Minister, as well as the French Prime Minister, were expected to arrive at Munich the next day.

I asked the Fuehrer, that is to say I told him, that under all circumstances I would like to go there also. Then I suggested that I could take Herr von Neurath with me. He also agreed.

Then I took part at the conversations, and sometimes I contributed, first of all, on all sides to establish an atmosphere of friendship. I had personal conversations with M. Daladier and Mr. Chamberlain, and I was very happy afterwards, sincerely happy, that everything had gone well.

Q Before that was the annexation of Austria to Germany. What reasons did Hitler have for this decision, and what was your part in these measures?

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A I said yesterday when I gave information about my life -- I told the Tribunal personally I felt a great affinity to Austria; that I spent the greatest part of my youth on a Austrian Castle; that my father, during the old monarchy had beenin favor of a closer connection in the future of the German country of Austria with Germany; that he always spoke about that, since he was convinced that this Reich, meaning Austria, would not keep together for a long time.

In 1918 while in Austria for two days, where I went by plane, I experiencedthe revolution and the collapse of the Habsburg Empire. The German countries, including Sudeten Germany, convened at that time in Vienna in the parlament, declared themselves free of any influence of the dissolved Austrian monarchy and stated, including the representatives of the Sudetenland, that Austria was a part of the German Reich, as much as I remember under the then Social Democratic Chancellor Renner. This statement by the Austrian German people to be in the future a part of Germany was changed by the peace treaty of St. Germain and prohibited by the victorious nations. Neither for myself nor for any other German was that of importance. It was of matter, of course, that the elements would be created that a union between the two brother nations of purely German blood should take place. When we came to power, of course, and as I have said before, this was an integral part of German policy.

The assurances which Hitler gave at that time regarding the sovereignty of Austria were no deception but they were considered very seriously because at first he did not see any other possibility. I myself was much more radical in that direction and I asked him repeatedly not to make any definite statements on the Austrian question. He, however, believed that he had to take a great concern regarding Italy.

It was evident that especially after the National Socialist Party in Germany had come to power also the National Socialist Party in Austria grew more and more. This party, however, before the coming to power in Germany, had existed in Austria as wel l as the source of the National Socialist Party which can be found in Sudeten Germany. The Party in Austria was therefore not a fifth column for the Anschluss because the annexation was demanded originally and always by the Austrian people themselves. If, therefore, the idea of the

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Anschluss did not exist so clearly with the then Austrian Government, then it was not for the reason that they did not want to go with Germany but because the form of government of National Socialism was incompatible with the form of government in Austria at that time.

There resulted tension first in Austria itself, which has repeatedly been mentioned by the Prosecution in its charges. These tensions had to exist because there were people who accepted the thought of annexation, of Anschluss with Germany and the government did not. This resulted in political fights. That we were on the side of the National Socialists as far as our sympathies were concerned is evident, particularly since the Party in Austria was persecuted. Many of them were put into camps, which were exactly the same thing as concentration camps only under different names.

The leader of the Austrian Party at a certain time was a man by the name of Habicht. I did not know him before, I met him once later. He, before the Dollfuss case, made believe to the Fuehrer that the Austrian Army had decided to undertake something on their own in order to force the government into the Anschluss or to overthrow it. He wanted to know if this would be the case if the Party in Austria would go with them. If the Austrian Army would do anything like that the Fuehrer, of course, said that the Party should support it. But the whole thing was a deception because not the Austrian Army was against the Austrian Government or determined to do anything against the government but a so-called Wehrmacht Standarte, a unit which consisted of former members, discharged members of the Austrian Army and had joined the Party. With this deceptive maneuver Mr. Habicht undertook his actions in Vienna. I was then in Beyreuth with the Fuehrer. He called Habicht and told him that he had given him the wrong information and had deceived him.

He regretted the death of Dollfuss very much because politically that meant a serious situation as far as the National Socialists were concerned and also with regard to Italy. Italy mobilized five divisions at that time and sent them to the Brenner Pass. The Fuehrer desired a quick appeasement. That was the reason why he had asked Herr von Papen to go as an extraordinary ambassador to Vienna and to strive for a quick peace of the political atmosphere there.

H0083-0047

We cannot forget the somewhat absurd situation which had developed in the course of the years, that is to say, that a purely German country such as Austria would not have been influenced strongly from the German Government side but by the Italian Government. May I remind you of the statement of Mr. Churchill, that Austria is practically a branch of Italy.

After the undertaking against Dollfuss Italy was very strongly against Germany and made it clear Italy would be the country which would do something against such annexation. Therefore, besides the internal appeasement as to the relations between Germany and Austria by Herr von Papen, the Fuehrer also had tried to bring about a change in the attitude of Mussolini concerning this question. For this reason a short time after he went to Vienna -- maybe it was before, at any rate he attempted to bring about a different attitude.

I was of the opinion that in spite of everything we may have had in common in a philosophic sense between fascism and National Socialism, the annexation of our brother people was much more important than that coordination and if it was not possible to do it with Mussolini we would have to do it against him. Then the Italian-Ethiopian war started, the sanctions against Italy and here visible but not too clearly Germany was offered, if she would take part in the sanctions, that certain concessions would be made in the Austrian question. That was a difficult decision for the Fuehrer to make, to declare himself finally against Italy and achieve the Anschluss by these means or to secure Italy's attitude to his own attitude and to exclude Italy as an opponent of the Anschluss. I suggested to him at that time, in view of the somewhat vague offer regarding Austria from English-French circles, to try and find out first who was behind this offer and whether indeed both governments would be approachable on this point and could give assurances, that is to say, assurances in this direction, that this would be considered an internal German affair and not some vague assurances of a general nature.

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My suspicions proved right, that we could not get any clear assurances and under these circumstances, it was opportune to exclude Italy as the main opponent to the Anschluss because of the fact that we did not join any sanctions against Italy, and so on.

I was, furthermore, of the opinion that the great national interest for a union of these Germans should go beyond all objections of difficulties between the two present governments, and that could not be done simply by the fact of the government of the German Reich's ceding and joining Germany with Austria, but the Anschluss had to be executed sooner or later.

Then came the agreement of Berchtesgaden. I was not present at that time. I did not even agree to it because I opposed any definite statement which would continue that indecisive condition. For me, the complete union of all Germans was the only solution I could accept.

Shortly after Berchtesgaden, there was the plebescite which the then Chancellor Schuschnigg had called. This plebescite as an impossibility. I will overlook the influence of the Berchtesgaden agreement, but the way this plebescite was supposed to take place was unique in history. One could only answer by "yes". Each one could vote as often as he wanted, five times, six times, seven times. If he tore up the slip of paper, that was counted as yes, and so on. That is not really very interesting.

In this way, it could be seen that if only a few followers of the system of Schuschnigg had utilized these opportunities sufficiently there could only be a positive majority for Schuschnigg. That whole thing was a farce.

We opposed that. First a member of the Austrian Government who was at that moment in Germany, General von Glaise-Horstenau, was flown to Vienna in order to make clear to Schuschnigg or Seyss-Inquart -- who, since Berchtesgaden, had been in the cabinet of Schuschnigg -- that Germany would never tolerate this provocation. At the same time, troops which were stationed near the Austrian border were alerted.

That was on Friday, I believe, the 11th. On that day, I was in the Reichschancellory with the Fuehrer and we were alone in the room. I received the telephone information that Glaize-Horstenau had arrived and turned over our demands clearly, and that these things were now being discussed. Then, as far as I remember, the answer came that the plebescite would not take place, and

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Schuschnigg agreed with that solution. At that moment I had a feeling that now the situation had started to glide, and that now, finally, the possibility which we had waited for existed, of bringing about the entire and total solution, and from that moment on I must take one hundred per cent responsibility for all further happenings, because it was less the Fuehrer than myself who at that time decided about the speed, and I even overruled objections by the Fuehrer and brought everything to its final development.

My telephone conversations have been read here. I demanded spontaneously, without having spoken to the Fuehrer about it, the immediate retirement of Chancellor Schuschnigg. When this was granted, I put my next demand, so that now the whole matter was ripe for the annexation, and, as it is well known, it took place.

The only thing -- and I don't say this because it is important for me in the course of this trial -- which I did not cause personally -- and that only because I did not know the personalities involved, but during the last days it was mentioned by the prosecution -- was the following: I sent a list of ministers through. That is to say, I named those members who at first would be considered desirable as members of an Austrian government by our side. I knew Seyss-Inquart, and it was clear to me that he should get the Chancellorship. Then I named Kaltenbrunner for security. I did not know Kaltenbrunner, and that is one of the two things in which the Fuehrer intervened in giving me a few names. Also I gave the name of Fischboeck for the unimportant Ministry of Economics without knowing him.

The only one whom I personally brought into this cabinet was my brother-in-law, Dr. Hueber, as Minister of Justice, but not because he was my brother-in-law. He was already Austrian Minister of Justice. He had been in the cabinet of Dr. Seidl. He was not a member of the Party at that time, but he came out of the ranks of the Heimwehr and it was important to me to have one of that part with whom we had initially worked, and with whom we had fought at times. I wanted to have one of them in the cabinet, and I wanted to have my interests secured so that everything now would develop in the sense of a total Anschluss, because at that time already plans appeared to the extent that the Fuehrer only, as the head of the German Reich, should at the same time be the head of German Austria, but otherwise there should be a separation. That I considered intolerable. The hour of decision had come and we

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had to make the best use of it.

During a conversation which I had with Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop who was in London at that time, I stressed that the ultimatum had not been put by ourselves but by Seyss-Inquart. That was absolutely true. Legally, in fact, of course I put it, but that telephone conversation was heard on the English side and I had to conduct a diplomatic conversation, and I have never heard yet that diplomats in such cases say later how it was in fact, but they always stress how it was de jure, and why should I be an exception there?

In this telephone conversation, I demanded of von Ribbentrop that he ask the British Government to name British personalities in whom they had full confidence, and I would make everything available to make sure that these people could travel throughout Austria in order to see for themselves that the Austrian people, in overwhelming majority, wanted this Anschluss and greeted it with enthusiasm.

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Here, during the treatment of the Austrian question, one never talked about the fact that these events had already taken place on Friday. The Sunday before, in Styria, a main section of the country -- an internal part -- annexation had taken place. But there already the people had declared themselves in favor of the Anschluss and stated that they wanted to have nothing to do with the Viennese Government.

Q I have just handed you a record of that conversation. Would you like to look at it?

A I only want to point out that which should be brought out, better than the documents, that only these parts are read where I point out that the British Government should as soon as possible send to Austria people in whom they have confidence, in order that they may see for themselves. Second, that we are going to hold a plebiscite according to the Charter of the Saar Plebiscite, and that whatever the result may be, we shall acknowledge that. I could promise that all the more, as it was known to me, and clear, that an overwhelming majority would vote in favor of the Anschluss.

Now I come to the decisive part of the march of the troops. That was the second point, where the Fuehrer and I were not of the same opinion.

The Fuehrer wanted the march into Austria on the basis of a demand of the new Government of Seyss-Inquart that they wanted the troops for pacification of the country. I was against it, and I would like to be understood, not against the march into Austria; I was for the march under all circumstances. It touched only the reasoning. Here a distinction must be carefully made. Certainly it was possible. At one point General Neustadt said there could be disturbances, because some of the Austrian Marxists who once before had started an armed uprising were still armed. That, however, was not of such a decisive nature. It was of the greatest importance that immediately German troops should march into Austria in order to stave off any desire of the neighbor who would wish to inherit only one single Austrian village.

I would like to underline that at that time the attitude of Mussolini was not quite stated, although I had worked on him the year before in that direction. The Italians were still looking for the East Tyrol. The five

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divisions along the Brenner -- well, I did not forget about those. The Hungarians talked too much about the Burgenland. The Yugo-Slavs once mentioned something about Thuringia, but I believe that I made it clear to them that that was crazy.

So to counteract these hopes once and for all, I definitely wanted the march of the German troops into Austria, under the motto "The Anschluss has taken place; Austria is a part of Germany," and therefore in its spirit automatically and completely under the protection of the German Reich and its Armed Forces. The Fuehrer did not want to stress this demonstration and finally had me communicate with Seyss-Inquart to send a telegram, once we were in agreement about the main points. I told Seyss-Inquart that he didn't have to send a telegram, that he could tell me by telephone. That was the reason that the consent of Mussolini came only at 11:30 at night. It is well known what a relief that brought to the Fuehrer.

In the evening of the same day, after everything had become clear, I went to the Air Force Club, where I had been visited several weeks before. I mention this because here also that has been described as a manouver of deception. The invitation for that had been sent out at a time when not even the Berchtesgaden conference had as yet taken place. There I met almost all the diplomats. I immediately spoke to Sir Nevile Henderson, the British Ambassador, talked to him for two hours, explained all the reasons to him again, and also asked him to tell me. And I asked Ribbentrop the same some time later, "Which nation has been damaged in any way by our union with Austria? From whom have we taken anything and whom have we harmed?"

This was an absolute restitution, because both partners had belonged within the German Reich, had been together for centuries, and only by political construction, the later monarchy, they had been separated.

When the Fuehrer flew to Austria the next morning, I took over all the business in the Reich. At that time I prohibited the return of the Austrian Legion to Austria -- that was a group of people who had to leave Austria during the fighting period of the party -- because I did not want to have any disturbances. Secondly, however, I also made sure that north of the Danube,

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that is to say, between the Czechoslovak border and the Danube, only one battalion should march through the villages, so that Czechoslovakia should see from that that this was only an Austro-German affair. That battalion had to march through there so that the towns north of the Danube should also take part in the jubilation.

In this connection, and finally, I want to stress two points:

If Mr. Messersmith in his long affidavit has expressed, I had before the Anschluss made various visits to Yugoslavia and Hungary in order to gain the cooperation of both these nations for the Anschluss, and if he declares that I had promised to Yugoslavia portions of Thuringia, then in answer to this statement I can say that I do not understand them at all. My visits in Yugoslavia and throughout the other Balkan countries were designed to improve the conditions, particularly economic relations, trade relations, which were very important for me with respect to the four-yearplan, and if at any time Yugoslavia had demanded one single village of Thuringia, I would have said that on such a point I would not even answer, because if any country is German from the roots then that is Thuringia.

The second point: Here in the indictment the expression "aggressive war against Austria" is used. Aggressive war is conducted by shooting, dropping bombs and so on; but here only one thing was dropped -- and that was flowers. But maybe the Prosecution wants it understood differently. And there I could agree. I personally have always stated that I would do anything to make sure that the Anschluss should not disturb the peace, but that in the long run if we should not be permitted to effect the

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annexation in order to make possible for theseGermans to return to Germany I would also resort to war.

So I believe, in brief, I have given an explanation of the events in Austria. And I would like to close with this statement, that here, not as much the Fuehrer, but I personally am prepared to take the full and entire responsibility for everything that has happened.

Q On the evening before the march of the troops into Austria you also had a conversation with Dr. Massny, the Ambassador of Czechoslovakia. On this occasion you are supposed to have made a statement. What about that conversation?

A I am grateful that I finally can say something about this "word of honor" that I supposedly gave, which was mentioned during the last month, so that I can finally speak about it frankly.

I mentioned that on that evening almost all diplomats were present. After I had spoken to Sir Neville Henderson and returned to the rest of the party, the Czechoslovakian Ambassador, Dr. Massny, came to me, very excited, shaking, and he asked me, what had happened that night and whether we intended also to march into Czechoslovakia. I gave him a short explanation and said, "No, it is only the question of the annexation of Austria; it has absolutely nothing to do with your country, especially so if you keep away from it entirely."

He thanked me and went to the telephone, so it seemed, but after a shor time he came back even more excited, and I had the impression that in his excitement he could not even understand me clearly any more. I told him then, in the presence of others, "Your Excellency, listen carefully now. I give you my personal word of honor that this is a question of the annexation of Austria only and that not a single German soldier will come anywhere near the Czechoslovakian border. You take care now that on the sid of Czechoslovakia there be no mobilization which might tend to create any disturbance."

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At no time did I tell him, "I give my word of honor that for all time we will never have anything to do with Czechoslovakia."

All he wanted was an explanation for that particular time, for that particular event. I gave him the explaration, because I had already expressed, before that, that the solution of the Sudeten problem would be necessary at some time. I would never have given my word of honor for a final solution, and it would not have been possible for me, because before that I had already made the statement in a different direction. At that time and in connection with the Austrian events, I only assured him that Czechoslovakia at that time would not be touched. I could give him my word of honor on my best conscience, because at that time no decisions had been taken about the Czechoslovakian or the Sudeten problems.

Q On the 15th of March, 1939, a conversation took place between Hitler and President Hacha. Were you present during that conversation? And what was your part in it?

A That was the beginning of the establishment of the Protectorate in Czechoslovakia. After Munich -- that is to say, after the agreement of Munich and the solution of the Sudeten German problem, between the Fuehrer and some of his collaborators -- a decision had been taken to mean that if there should be renewed difficulties after the agreement of Munich or from the occupation of these zones, certain measures of precaution had to be taken by military authorities, because after the occupation of the zones the troops who had been in readiness for the "Case Gruen" had been demobilized. But a development could take place which at any moment could become extremely dangerous for Germany.

We only have to remember what interpretation at that time was given by the Russian press, for instance, the Russian broadcasts, to the agreemen of Munich and to the occupation of the Sudeten areas. One could not use stronger words. A connection between Prague and Moscow had existed for a long time. Prague, disappointed by the agreement of Munich, could not strengthen its ties with Moscow. We saw signs of that, particularly in the Czech officers' corps. We received information about that. And

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since there were possibilities of danger from that side, directives had been issued to the various military instances to take precautions. That order has nothing to do with an intention to occupy, after a short time, all the rest of Czechoslovakia.

H0083-0057

I went personally at the end of January for a long vacation in the Riviera, and during that time I retired from all my offices. At the beginning of March, much to my surprise, a courier came from the Fuehrer with a letter in which the Fuehrer informed me that developments in Czechoslovakia were such that it was intolerable for him to let things go on. There was an increasing menace for Germany, and he was determined to solve the question now by eliminating Czechoslovakia as a source of danger right in the center of Europe, and therefore he was thinking of occupation.

During that time I had met many Englishmen. I had recognized that after Munich they were quite satisfied, but that any other incidents or demands on Czechoslovakia would cause considerable excitement.

I sent a letter back by courier. Maybe it is among the many tons of documents that have been captured. I would understand if it would not be submitted. In this letter I explained to the Fuehrer in this sense, that if this were to take place--meaning the occupation of Czechoslovakia--this would be a very serious loss of prestige for the British Prime Minister, and I hardly believed that he could stand it. Then probably Mr. Churchill would come in, and the Fuehrer knew Churchill's attitude toward Germany.

Then, one would not understand it, since just a short time before that the whole problem had been considered solved.

Thirdly, I thought I could tell him the following. I believed that what he wanted to eliminate in the way of dangerous elements by occupation of Czechoslovakia could be achieved in a somewhat lengthier manner and under consideration of all the elements which would excite Czechoslovakia as well as other countries. I was convinced that after the Sudetenland had been separated from Czechoslovakia and Austria was a part of Germany, an economic penetration of Czechoslovakia would only be a matter of time. That is to say, I hoped by strong economic ties to come to a customs

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union, transport union, currency union, based upon the mutual interests of our economies.

If this were to take place, then from the political point of view a sovereign state of Czechoslovakia would be so strongly tied with Germany and tied to Germany that I would not anticipate any danger any more.

However, if Slovakia would express her tendency for independence and sovereignty, we should not counteract that in any way. On the contrary, we could support it, for, of course, economic co-operation would become much closer than otherwise, for, if Slovakia were to be separated, both countries would depend economically so much on Germany that both countries could be interested economically and tied economically.

This letter, and I just give the gist of it, the courier returned.

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time for us to break off?

(A recess was taken.)

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DR. STAHMER: Will you continue, please?

THE WITNESS: Yes. I had to go to Berlin at very short notice. I arrived in the morning and President Hacha arrived in the evening of the same day. I reported verbally to the Fuehrer what I had emphasized earlier in my letter. The Fuehrer pointed out that he had certain evidence to the effect that the situation in Czechoslovakia had developed considerably.

On one side the state had disintegrated because of the sketchy detachment of the Slovaki, but that was not the decisive question. He showed me documents from the Intelligence Service which pointed out that Russian aviator commissions were on certain airdromes in Czechoslovakia and were carrying out training there, and that these things were not in keeping with the Pact of Munich. He said that he feared as before, particularly now, that Slovakia has been detached from Czechoslovakia: Czechoslovakia would now be utilized for Russian air bases. So he said he was determined to do away with that threat.

President Hacha had requested an interview, so he told me at the time, and would arrive in the evening, and he wished that I should be present at the Reich Chancellery too. President Hacha arrived and first of all talked with the Reich Foreign Minister. Later on he went to see the Fuehrer, who greeted him briefly. First of all, the two of them conversed alone; then we were called in. Subsequently I talked to him in the presence of his Ambassador, and I urged him that the demand of the Fuehrer, that the troops should be kept back when the German Armies marched in, should be met with as quickly as possible. I told him it wouldn't help us at all to object. The Fuehrer had made a decision and considered it necessary, and unnecessary bloodshed should be avoided and resistance for any length of time was quite impossible. And in that connection I made the statement that I was sorry if I had to bomb beautiful Prague. The intention to bomb Prague did not exist, nor was there an order of that kind. Even if

H0083-0060

resistance would have been a necessity, resistance could easily at all times have been broken without that bombing. But such a pointer I thought might serve as an argument to accelerate the whole matter.

I succeeded in establishing a telephone communication between him and his government in Prague, as a result of which the occupation and the march into Czechoslovakia took place the following day.

BY DR. STAHMER:

Q Did you accompany the Fuehrer to Prague?

A No, I did not accompany him to Prague. I was a little angry. Czechoslovakia without Sudeten-Germany has never been visited by me ever since that incident with the exception of the 21st of April 1945 when I passed through a part of Czechoslovakia.

Q Why were you angry?

A Because the whole matter was done rather over my head.

Q Did other powers join the occupation of Czechoslovakia?

A Yes. Poland occupied the Olsa territory.

Q The Prosecution have presented a document from which the conclusion was drawn that the murder of the German Ambassador, after anti German demonstrations in Prague, was to take place. It has been represented as if this assasination of the German Ambassador was to be carried out so as to give a cuase for the annexation.

A That story comes before the solution of the Sudeten-German problem, and I listened pretty carefully when that point came up. What is more, I remember what the facts really were. It wasn't discussed in that sense and couldn't have been done in that way, as if we wanted to murder our own Ambassador so as to find a cause for the solution of that problem. But the possibility which could lead to immediate clashes existed, considering the tension which existed between Czechoslovakia and Germany over the Sudeten-German problem, and offered the possibility that in fact the German Ambassador in Prague could be assassinated, and by Czechs, and that this would necessitate immediate action on Germany's part under all circumstances, and that in disregard of any other political negotiations.

H0083-0061

This possibility arose from the situation that outside the Embassy in Prague considerable undeniable demonstrations had taken place, so that the defense of the German Embassy had to be assured by sending arms to them; so threatening was the situation. On the strength of this report that possibility was discussed which had been wrongly understood here. It wasn't us who wanted to have the Ambassador assassinated. We said that the possibility of such an assassination by another party existed, and that because of that the Fuehrer would then have to take immiedate action.

Q To what extent were confiscations carried out in Czechoslovaki

A Before the war no confiscation took place in Czechoslovakia, in the sense that economic goods were taken away; to the contrary the considerable economic capacity of Czechoslovakia was included to its full extent in the economic capacity of Germany, that is to say, most of all we attached importance to the fact that now that we had declared the Protectorate as existing and that the action was complete, as a matter of course the Skoda Works, the Brunn Armament Factories, and other important armament industries should be added to the armament potential in Germany. That means that orders were sent there to a considerable degree. Over and above that we even created new industries there, and support in that respect was given.

Accusations had been raised that among other things we dismantled the railways which were new and replaced them with old rails from Germany. I believe that this is a complete error. The traffic system in Czechoslovakia, the Protectorate, was one of the most important for Germany. The entire south-eastern traffic from the Balkans went through the Protectorate firstly, in the direction of Vienna, Prague, Dresden and Berlin, and secondly, the main line of Vienna Luneberg Odeberg and Breslau. And since the canal had not been completed the entire traffic of all economic goods no longer went around the outside but took the shortest way. We would have been crazy if we had weakened that traffic system. I can assume only one reason, and that

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is that during the extension of the existing traffic system certain rails from German stock were used which later appeared in the government report as being old. But that we dismantled new for old is quite incorrect.

Furthermore, it was natural that when the Sudetenland was included in the Reich, the accusation that state property and forests were taken over by the German state is incorrect. It is naturally a matter of course that if a country is taken over then the state property must also become the property of the new state.

The accusation, furthermore, so far as Sudeten-Germany is concerned, that banks were included into German banks is of course not justified. For that country German currency was introduced, and subsequently the banking institute had to be converted to that.

So far as the latter Protectorate is concerned, I have already emphasized that even before the creation of that Protectorate a strong economic penetration of Czechoslovakia had been attempted by me, and that "by me" means that on the one hand we acquired shares which gave us a holding in private economic enterprise; and furthermore, by the withdrawing of certain loans which had been given by western powers, which we replaced.

In that connection the Reich Works Hermann Goering appeared on the scene there too, since they took over a considerable share of the Skoda Works so as to utilize that and their industrial power in their own program just as any of the other industries of Germany.

It is, therefore, a matter of course that after the creation of the Protectorate, the total economic capacity of the then Protectorate must have been included in the total economic potential of Germany.

Q On the 15th of November 1937, a meeting took place at the Reichs Chancellory, of which one Colonel Hoszbach prepared a protocol, a record, and that has been referred to as the last will. It has been the subject of this trial repeatedly, and may I ask you for a short explanation on what significance that conference had. I am going to have that document shown to you for you to have a brief glance at it. It is 386-PS.

A This document has already been shown to me here, yes. I know it approximately as far as contents are concerned. This document plays an important part in the Indictment, since it has appeared under the heading "Last will of the Fuehrer." This word is, in fact, used in one part of this last record, and it is used by Hoszbach.

As far as the technical part of this record is concerned, I want to say this. Hoszbach was the adjutant of the Fuehrer. He was the chief adjutant. As such, he was present during that conference, and he took notes. Five days later, as I have since ascertained, he then prepared this record on the strength of those notes he made. This is, therefore, a record which contains all the mistakes which are bound to occur during such a record which is made without a stenographer, and which under certain circumstances can represent opinions of the person concerned or opinions or conceptions of his. It contains a number of expressions, as I have said before, which I will take exactly were what the Fuehrer has said repeatedly, but there are other points which I can say do not represent the Fuehrer's way of expressing himself.

During the last month I have seen so many records of interrogations, some of which had nothing to do with or even had the hint of what has been stated, that I must point out the sources of mistakes in this connection.

As far as the word "testament" is concerned, this contradicts completely

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what conceptions the Fuehrer had. If anybody knows anything about this conceptions, then it is I.

The successor had not been decided as late as the first of September 1939, but as early as the late autumn 1934. I have had opportunities quite often to discuss the question of a political last will with the Fuehrer, and he turned it down, giving us a reason that one could never appoint a successor by means of a political last will, that the developments in political events should give complete freedom of action at all times. Quite possibly someone could state political wishes and conceptions, but never binding statements in the shape of a last will. That was then, and as long as I have ever had his confidence, always his conception.

Now, what was he aiming at with the contents of this document? People were called together with the Minister of War, the Supreme Commander of the Army, the Supreme Commander of the Navy, the Air Force, and the then Reichs Foreign Minister. Shortly before that the Fuehrer had informed me that he was going to call that meeting, mostly to put pressure behind General von Fritsch, since he was dissatisfied with the rearmament of the Army. He said it wouldn't do any damage if von Blomberg would also exercise a certain pressure on von Fritsch.

I asked whether von Neurath ought to be present, and he said, yes, he didn't want the thing to look too military. It probably wasn't necessary but he wanted to make it very clear to Fritsch that the foreign political situation required a forced speed of armament and that for that reason he had asked the Foreign Minister to come along, who knew nothing about the details.

The statements were then worded in such a way as the Fuehrer preferred in such connections. He went to great length to picture the political situation, and he talked about the whole world situation from all angles; and anybody who knew him as well as I did knew the purpose he pursued. He was quite clearly aiming at saying that he had considerable plans, and that this and that was the political situation.

The final result was the creation of a strong armament program. I would like to say that if the Fuehrer, one or two hours later, had talked to another group, for instance, diplomats, or the Foreign Office, or shall

H0083-0065

we say, officers of the Party, then he probably would have represented matters quite differently.

Nevertheless, some of these statements here do contain the principal attitudes of the Furher , but the extent of significance which is being attached to that document today, that I can hardly attach to this document, not to the best of my ability.

Q You said you had been appointed the successor of the Fuehrer. Were you in that capacity led into all political problems by the Fuehrer?

A I am now talking of the period of my good relations, which lasted until long into the war. Of course he kept me informed of all important political and military problems. I was included, and this mostly occurred during many and long discussions, which would take place for many hours, day after day. Occasionally about foreign political questions I was sometimes surprised, but whenever possible I would include myself. On one occasion he did say, in fact, that I had my own foreign political opinions, and that he didn't always find it easy to agree with me, but I want to emphasize that in all important political questions I was included.

Q On the 23rd of May 1939, a conference took place with the Fuehrer, about which, during the interrogation or examination of the witness Milch, statements were made.

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A record of that has also been made, and it is Document L-79. According to the wording of that record, you participated in this meeting, and the Witness Milch stated that you were not present.

A I was, in fact, not present. Milch went there at the last moment to represent me, but of course if the witness Milch says that he had not had the Fuehrer's permission to inform me, then you must understand that in that way the Fuehrer would not have such a point communicated to me by my Secretary of State, but that he wished to communicate it to me personally.

No, I am sorry, I have actually been present at that meeting. I just now see that from another clue, but even if I hadn't been present I think Milch must be talking about another meeting. Then that wouldn't be of any importance. It is out of the question that the Fuehrer would have had a conference with such gentlemen without notifying me either before or afterwards if I myself was absent. It is, therefore, not at all important.

It is quite a matter of course that here in such cases I was either informed previously, or, if I wasn't present, afterwards in great detail by the Fuehrer. But I gather that Milch must have made a mistake here, and he is probably referring to another meeting, since right at the end I asked questions about the armament program, which I now recollect exactly.

Q What was the significance of that meeting?

A It was a conference held by the Fuehrer when he once more stated the views, told us about the situation, and described the position of the Army which arose from that situation. Once more the point he had in mind was that the Army, from the point of view of armament and preparedness, should be aware that he expected all sorts of political developments, and that he reserved for himself complete freedom of decision.

Retrospectively, regarding the events which had occurred up to that time -- and I needn't emphasize how easily matters which are regarded retrospectively are regarded in a different light of development and represented in that way than compared with what they have in fact been before. It is easy to say afterwards, "I wanted that at that time, this and that." I have achieved it in the meantime, and it is of course so easy to say "That has always been my intention," although one knows perfectly well that originally

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a number of other factors were important regarding whether developments would be just like that, and that in fact his intentions may have been completely different under different circumstances.

And, generally, speaking, this is another case where misconceptions on the part of the adjutant have arisen, but, on the whole, it is one of those typical conferences which the Fuehrer used to hold when he had one particular purpose in mind which he wanted to achieve, and he wanted to lend the necessary emphasis to that aim.

H0083-0068

Q During the years from 1935 to 1938 you have made various state visits to Poland. What was the purpose of these visits?

A After German-Polish relations had been clarified in 1934, the Fuehrer wished a strengthening of that pact and the creation of a better personal atmosphere. He requested me to take on that task and that for the reason he believed that I would find it easy to make contact with these Polish gentlemen, which was indeed the case.

The president of the Polish State invited me. This was in 1935, 1936, 1937 -- in fact every year -- and I spent one or two weeks in Poland on each occasion. I had discussions with the then Marshal Pilsudski and later on always with the Foreign Minister.

At that time the Fuehrer had given me the task -- and this was a serious task -- that apart from a continuing improvement of relations I should tell Poland that we were interested in a strong Poland, because a strong Poland would be an excellent barrier between Germany and Russia. The solution of the Danzig and Corridor question was emphasized at that time by the Fuehrer, and it had to be expected that until then he was hoping that some opportunity would arise to come to a solution with Poland about that problem. The Lithuanian problem came into that, and what is the decisive factor is that he did not say, "You must hoodwink Poland. I am going to fall upon them afterwards." It was never the case, as it has been put here, that we used to get together and conspire for the attack to come, referring to every point of our intention. In fact, the whole situation arose out of the political developments as it does in the whole world, and always has.

Anyway, I was given that task. I conscientiously took it seriously and I carried it out in the honest belief that it was true. Consequently, when the clash occurred and Poland was invaded this was a situation that was very unpleasant for me.

Q What was your attitude toward the Memel, Danzig, and Corridor question?

A It was always quite clear. It was that Danzig and the Free State, as purely German territory, should at some date in the near future be returned to Germany. On the other hand,we certainly recognized that

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Poland should have access to the sea and a port. Consequently, our first thought has always been that the Free State and Danzig should be returned to us and that through the Polish Corridor a German traffic lane should be created. That was a most modest demand which for a long time was considered to be an absolutely necessary demand, and appeared as such. We considered that a perfectly bearable demand.

Q Another conference with the Fuehrer took place on the 23rd of November 1939. The record of that conference is the Document 789-PS, which will be presented to the Tribunal. I ask you to identify the document and tell me, briefly, what your attitude toward that conference is.

A About that I can be comparatively brief. This is an address before the supreme commanders of those formations and armies which were to be used for the attack in the West after Poland had been dealt with. It was a matter of course and required no discussion when the supreme commander of an armed force who is actively leading that force decides to carry out a strategic and considerable tactical operation. In this case it means that after the end of the Polish Campaign the Fuehrer wished definitely -- and that was perfectly correct -- as early as that autumn to change his troops over and carry out the blow against France, so that as

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early as the autumn and winter of 1939 the end of that campaign could be achieved. What prevented was the weather, since without using an airforce, and particularly the penetration of the Maginot Line, that could not be carried out. We needed good weather for at least four or five days, what we call flying weather, only week after week it was impossible to promise him that and the matter dragged on until the winter and was eventually postponed until the beginning of the following spring. But here he was of the opinion that he could still carry it through in the near future.

But he called the supreme commanders together, those of his commanders whom he was giving orders for that attack. It was one of the speeches that were customary in such cases. Naturally, since the Fuehrer was not only a military man but in the first place a politician, it always arose that these military speeches, which a military person would have confined to the military and strategical problems, always ended in his stating his political conceptions, et cetera. It must never be forgotten that he gave such speeches not only as the Supreme Commander of the armed forces, but as the head of the state in Germany, and that is why so frequently even during military speeches such a strong political momentum crept into the speeches.

But no general was asked what his opinions were and whether he approved of the principal tendencies of the policy. Why, during such speeches he wasn't even asked whether he approved of the military plans or not. That appeared at another time. If a matter was finished and when he discussed the strategic attack of the plan with the commander, then, in the way of summing up, which was added to the political discussion, the generals were then told the final great thought of the Fuehrer; and if -- and this I emphasize since it has crept in so often in the trial -- if a general had been able to say, "My Fuehrer, I consider your statements wrong and I don't agree with the pact we have made" or "This is not the policy of which we can approve," it would be impossible to understand. Not because that particular general would have been shot, but I would have doubted the sanity of that man, because how can one imagine that a state can be led if during war or before a war the political leaders have decided, whether wrong or right, what they

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are going to do and the individual general would then vote whether he was going to follow or not, whether his army corps was going to enter into the battle "but not until I have asked a division." Perhaps one would help and one would stay at home. That right in that case would have to be reserved for the simple people too. Perhaps this is the way to avoid wars in the future, if you ask every general and every soldier whether he wants to go home or not; but not only in the leadership of this state but in any state of the world the military formula is clearly defined. When there is a war or when the leader decides that there is a war, then the military leaders receive their military task. On that they can made comment, They can comment whether they prefer an attack on the left or the right or in the center, but anything else, whether he will march through a neutral state or not, is not the business of the military leaders. That is entirely the responsibility of the political leaders of the state. In this case the possibility of general discussion, arguments between right or wrong, could not possibly follow. When the general received the order that the supreme war lord had decided, that finished all argument for a soldier, and that refers to the Fieldmarshal just as to the ordinary soldier.

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Q A Fuehrer Decree of October 7, 1939, bears your signature. In that decree, Himmler was given the task to Germanize -- That decree is Document 686-Ps -- Tell me of what significance that decree is?

A That decree of October 7, 1939, was issued after the Polish campaign had ended. Poland at that time had been conquered and the Polish State as such had ceased to exist. I draw your attention to the note of the People's Commission, of Moletov, who defines his attitude in that connection and in consequence, that in justice that Germany had felt, when in the Treaty of Versailles German provinces had been detached and given to Poland, that injustice had been eliminated from the victory of Britain. There is therefore a matter, of course, for us that that part of Poland which, until 1918, had been German, would once more go back to Germany and Germanize, that is to say, included in the fatherland, but in that territory, in the course of years, more than one million Germans who lived there originally or had property there, particularly agriculture property, territory, farms, and so forth, these Germans had been thrown out and disappropriated. That is quite clear from numerous complaints which, during the years after 1919 had been sent to the League of Nations about that subject -- a study of all these complaints and all the events which had been reported as to that and still may be in the archives at Geneva, would prove and confirm to what enormous degree the decolonization of that German territory was carried out. That decree was aiming at the retracting of those steps so that these territories would become German once more, which means that those farms from which Germans had been driven, should once more come into the hands of Germans. The fact that this task was given to Himmler, did not meet with full agreement from me and up until that time, that was not of decisive importance. He was given the task not in his capacity as the Chief of the Police but -- as is known -- that he was always particularly and keenly interested in the questions of reincarnation of German men and time, that department -- just a moment -- after all, it is immaterial anyway -- that new department was formed and he was issued the new tasks. The Fuehrer published the order. I cooperated, of course, since I was the Chairman of the Ministerial Council at the time and, then also signed by the Chief of the Chancellery Lammers. My attitude was positive. It simply met with my approval. I know the Germans had been driven out; I knew they were German territories and I wanted them to come back to

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us, but I want to draw your attention to the fact that I am here talking about the former German province.

Q You mean the Western Polish Provinces?

A Yes. The Government, for instance, was not designated for the Germanization, if Germans were settled there later on, and I am not certain of that -- then that does not, was not done on the basis of this decree. You asked about my attitude regarding the Memel problem. Danzig and the Polish Corridor, I have dealt with. Memel was a comparatively small matter. In Memel, according to the Treaty of Versailles and League of Nations there was, shortly before that the Lithuanians who occupied Memel and the neighboring territory to prevent the plebiscite. Compalints of the government did not bring any results just as none of the others. It was regretted, it was considered wrong, and it was not considered right what was done but as far as returning of the country or the carrying out of that plebiscite was concerned, that was out of the question. After the Lithuanian rule which was at the time it had occupied Memel, it was naturally our absolute national right to rectify that thing and to occupy Memel this time ourselves.

Q On the 19 October 1939, you published a decree which ordered the removal of economic goods from Poland. That is the document we see 418 and has been presented to the Tribunal and I should like you to explain that decree to us.

A This is a decree which represents general instructions on what economic procedure should be adopted in all the Polish territories occupied by us. It regulates the obtaining of administration of the Polish State within the territories occupied by German troops and it gives a ruling on the money and credit system. It orders certain economic measures, preparation for arguments which would arise with foreign creditors, and so forth; confiscation can only be carried out by the trustee department, and so forth. It is not so much the taking away of economic goods, and that was in fact not done -- to the contrary. In the General Government, too, the economic system which existed there and particularly that which was there, being the war purposes of that period, was strengthened and extended. That economic factor, which was not absolutely essential, was cut down just as much as it was in the remainder of

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Germany and would have been in any other State in the event of war. As far as properties are concerned that existed and were important for the conduct of the war, such as steel or copper or tin, it was my will and my view that these raw materials should be used there where they could most quickly be used for manufacture. If it was on the spot and the traffic problem permitted it, then they should remain there and be used right there. If it was not possible to usethem in the country, then I would of course if I had the important raw materials there, would have had them brought to wherever their use could best and quickly be put into the war economic situation. That is generally what the decree says and that was my principal view and my principal order. They were put in the quickest and suitable use wherever possible.

Q On the 19th November 1925, a Dr. Muehlmann made an affidavit, which has b een presented by the prosecution under 3042-PS,(?) and which is worded as follows: I am quoting three short sentences:

"I was Special Deputy of the Governor General of Poland and had to secure art treasures in the Government General. The order was given to me by Goering in his capacity as the Chairman of the Committee for the Reich Defense. I confirm that it was the official policy of the Governor General Frank, that all important art treasures of Polish public institutions or private collections, or belonging to the church, be taken into custody. I confirm that the art treasures which I have mentioned were in fact confiscated and I am aware that in the event of a German victory, they would not have remained in Polish hands but would be used to complete German art property."

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In effect I had no direct method of securing art treasures from Poland. I sat as Chairman of the Ministerial Council and would have not the right. In fact, however, Muehlmann, who came to see me, told me that he was working for the securing of art treasures from without the world. It was my view that the art treasures from without the world. It was my view that the art treasures during the time of war, and there would have to have eventually, of what would be secured, protection so that no destruction could be possible through fires, or bombing, or anything like that. I want to emphasize immediately, and I shall, of course, refer to this matter later, that in connection with France, none of these art treasures were had for me in the so-called personal collection. That is on the other side. That these art treasures were in fact secured is correct, and it was defended who was to have them when the reason was that the owners were not available, but on the whole when they were present, and, here I remember a Count Pototsky, for instance, where the owner was present, the art treasures were left where they were. The exception regarding the final fate of these art treasures had not yet been final thoughts of the Fuehrer. But he had given an order, and I communicated that by letter to Muehlmann and Frank; he had sent a letter in order that these art treasures were the first of all to be brought to Koenigsberg. Four pictures were to be taken to the German Museum in Berlin, or rather to the Imperial Friedrich Museum in Berlin, and then I would like to say right now, and about which the Prosecution has confirmed against by the Fuehrer's drawings from Lemberg, that the Fuehrer's drawings from Lemberg were not confiscated by us at that time, and Lemberg had become Russian, and, it was wrong during the absence of Russia and during the period of battle when these Lemberg drawings, as far as I can remember the fact, were removed from the burning Lemberg building in order to save them from Russia and to handle them. He arrived with them, and visited me, and although I was normally mentally interested, I did not have time to look at them at leisure, since I

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was on my way to the Fuehrer at the time, when I did not have the time to take them along with me, and under that particular fact Muehlmann can confirm that straight away. What happened after that and where they went, I don't know, and perhaps with that I have answered the question referring to the Polish Art Treasures. Apart from that, there is the famous altar, which was originally made in Nurnberg and of German work, and this German work the Fuehrer wished. I have nothing to do with it personally, with this work of art, apart of being brought to Lemberg Dramatic Museum. I just happened to know of that, but the final distinction was, it had not been stated about that in the event I opposed, and this would have been my point, that I certainly had answered in the affirmative.

Q What connection did you have with Quisling?

A Quisling. Quisling. I met Quisling long after the occupation of Norway for the first and only time. He was in Berlin at the time, and visited me. I had a short and immaterial conversation, but before that, one of his representatives whom I did not know personally, either I met him before the outbreak of the war, sent a letter to me, which has been not shown to me, and which I cannot personally remember, since naturally when hardly put before me, and anyway, that is immaterial. In that letter the name of Quisling appeared, and we were asked to give financial support to his movements, and the letter contained an account of how far the political contributions were being paid, with Russia on one side, and England on the other, for political influence of the parties. Later on he only talked to me, and of means of supplying coal, and some support otherwise could be given to Quisling, and we adopted the attitude that, because of the foreign account situation, we are not very rich, or that we could not compete with the Russians or the British contributions, and that the thought of the department who could charge that to the support of Quisling, or not, could be had under that fact, and if they were to answer in the affirmative, then

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I, of course, was perfectly agreeable to meet him with some money. The figure, it was discussed, and it certainly would be given but was very much higher than the amount which was in fact later on paid by the Fuehrer, by the Foreign Office.

I have never thought much of the poor financial report of that that was given it by them; you are to give a lot so that you would achieve something, as I had my experience from the last World War. I am talking about the money which went into the Rumanian Parliament, which, in fact, was not of enough, and based on the experience then, on my experience, they gave well. Apart from that I think I must have met him very much later, and had a complete immaterial conversation with him, which I cannot recollect.

Q What was your attitude towards the Norway campaign?

A The Norwegian campaign, that surprised me rather; that was because in this connection, and that was peculiar, I had not been informed for quite some time. The Fuehrer went very far with that basic decree, which I have mentioned earlier, and that the air force was very late indeed, but since the air force had to do only the most important task in the campaign, I expressed myself unmistakably, and not at all in an offensive way, that situation. The whole of that military point of view I was perfectly favorably disposed to watch of the campaign, since as the Supreme Commander of the air force, and quite independently from the political consideration, I had to think over this strategic problem; since from between what was the point of view of the air force that would improve considerably by

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my Airforce coming through from a basic airport to England, as any reasonable expert is to say, of course. Consequently from the strategic point of view, and as Supreme Commander of the Airforce I could only approve of that operation. My objection merely was that I was opposed too late, and secondly, that the plan did not appear quite effectively but apart from that, that my attitude was perfectly positive.

Q Was Hitler afraid of the occupation of Sweden in that connection?

A Yes, but not because of occupation by German forces, but when the Fuehrer decided to occupy Norway, we already had considerable and detailed information regarding the intended occupation by the British and French, which we got to later, or even confirmed, when we had access to the Brish papers, and papers of the French General Staff. I offer to say to you in this connection that there was particularly a plan not only to occupy Norway, but presumable all Nordic to intercept Swedish ore supplies for Germany, and over and above that to interfer in the rations, and finished financial conflict at the time going on, and at the time in the State of Finland. The Fuehrer feared, of course, that Sweden would give in to British contribution, and as a like result hoping Finland then would permit the march through with the cutting off of Swedish resources and supplies which was coming to us. I had a very heavy responsibility at that time, and I took it upon myself by showing Hitler that I knew Sweden, and the Swedish people, and the King so well; that I knew they would bring Hitler to bear on Sweden, and no matter how powerful an opponent that Sweden would offer every resistance to defend its neutrality, if necessary, with arms against any one who wish to threate them, and from that matter was the reason for that action, and that I personally would pledge my word for that conviction, and with all my knowledge, I would take it upon myself to see that they could remain unafraid in that respect, and with that the question was settled.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

(The Tribunal adjourned until 15 February 1946, at 1000 hours)